Akumah (FC) v. London Borough of Hackney

The House of Lords held that a local housing authority has power to operate a parking control scheme on a housing estate as part of the "management, regulation and control" of its houses under section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1985, and that section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 gives ancillary power to do anything calculated to facilitate, or conducive or incidental to, the discharge of that function. The court rejected the argument that regulation of parking fell outside the scope of section 21(1) and could only be authorised by byelaws under section 23(1) or the special provision in section 7(1) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1975.

The House confined its decision to the narrow statutory issue and did not determine the validity of the respondent's particular scheme, nor the extent of powers to clamp vehicles or to impose penalty charges. Factual findings made below about alleged tampering with visitor vouchers and the incorrect contravention codes were not reopened on the statutory question and were not in issue on appeal.

Background and facts:

• The appellant was a tenant of a flat on the Woodberry Down housing estate owned by the London Borough of Hackney. The Council introduced, by council resolution rather than byelaw, a parking control scheme requiring the display of parking permits; visitors' permits contained ten vouchers to be completed in ink. On three occasions the appellant's car was clamped and penalty notices issued; on two occasions he paid to secure release and on the third he refused and the vehicle was towed and retained.
• The appellant sued in the Shoreditch County Court seeking return of sums paid and damages for wrongful detention. The district judge found the permits had been tampered with and dismissed the claim. On appeal His Honour Judge Cotran allowed the appeal on the basis that the vouchers were not invalid; the council then appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the council's appeal. The appellant obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

(i) Nature of the claim or application:

The appellant sought restitution of payments and damages claiming wrongful detention of his vehicle and, in earlier proceedings, challenged the council's authority to operate the parking scheme.

(ii) Issues framed by the court:

• Whether section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1985, read alone or with section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972, authorised a local housing authority to operate the type of parking control scheme in question.
• Whether regulation of parking was a separate function requiring specific statutory authorisation by byelaws under section 23(1) of the 1985 Act (and section 7(1) of the 1975 Act), or whether it was incidental to the management of housing.

(iii) Court's reasoning and disposition:

The House adopted a broad construction of "management, regulation and control" in section 21(1) and concluded that regulation of parking on a housing estate is capable of affecting the amenity and access enjoyed by tenants and therefore falls within estate management. Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 further authorises a local authority to do anything incidental or conducive to the discharge of its functions. Authorities on the wide construction of local authority powers were applied. The House therefore dismissed the appeal, holding the council had authority to institute and operate the parking scheme. The decision was restricted to the statutory construction point; the House did not determine the validity of the particular scheme, the correctness of the clamping or towing in the appellant's specific cases, nor other issues about penalty charges or private clamping actions.

Appeal dismissed. The House held that the council had statutory authority to operate a parking control scheme on the estate: regulation and control of parking falls within the management, regulation and control of houses under section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1985 and is supported by the ancillary powers in section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972. The court limited its ruling to that statutory construction and did not decide on the validity of the particular scheme or on clamping and penalty powers.

Initial proceedings in Shoreditch County Court (district judge: claim dismissed on finding vouchers tampered with); appeal to the county court (His Honour Judge Cotran) where the appellant's appeal was allowed and matter adjourned for assessment of damages; appeal by the Council to the Court of Appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 582) where the Council's appeal was allowed; final appeal to the House of Lords, permission granted by the Appeal Committee.