Akumah (FC) (Appellant) v. London Borough of Hackney (Respondents)

A local housing authority’s statutory function of managing, regulating and controlling its housing includes regulating vehicle parking on its housing estates. Parking control protects residents’ amenity, preserves access for service and emergency vehicles, and facilitates residents’ enjoyment of their homes.

In any event, section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 authorises measures calculated to facilitate, or conducive or incidental to, the authority’s housing-management function. The existence of a separate power to make parking byelaws, carrying criminal sanctions, does not restrict that management power or require a parking scheme to be established by byelaws.

The appellant was a council tenant on the respondent’s Woodberry Down Estate. The council operated a parking-control scheme established by resolution rather than byelaws. After the appellant’s vehicle was clamped on three occasions and eventually removed, he sought repayment of release charges and damages for wrongful detention.

The district judge dismissed the claim. A county court judge allowed the appellant’s appeal, but the Court of Appeal restored the district judge’s decision: [2002] EWCA Civ 582. The House considered only whether sections 21(1) and 12(1) of the Housing Act 1985, read with section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972, authorised a local housing authority to operate this type of parking scheme without making byelaws.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Carswell delivered the leading speech. Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe and Baroness Hale of Richmond agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Lord Carswell, section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1985 required a broad construction of the management, regulation and control of a local authority’s housing. The management of a housing estate was not confined to the physical dwellings or the terms of individual tenancy agreements. It extended to matters affecting residents’ access to and enjoyment of their homes. Regulating parking could prevent congestion, preserve residents’ parking facilities and secure access for service and emergency vehicles. It was therefore inherent in the management of housing on an estate.

3. Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 put the matter beyond doubt. A local authority’s functions comprise the duties and powers entrusted to it by Parliament. The section authorises ancillary acts which facilitate, or are conducive or incidental to, the proper discharge of those functions. Regulating estate parking for the benefit of residents and the orderly conduct of daily estate life fell within that ancillary power.

4. The authority did not have to rely on section 12(1) of the Housing Act 1985, which concerned the provision and maintenance of buildings or land serving a beneficial purpose. Nor did the existence of the byelaw powers in section 23(1) of that Act and section 7(1) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1975 narrow section 21(1). Those provisions concerned byelaws carrying criminal sanctions, and section 7 also extended the geographical reach of the byelaw power.

5. The House decided only the council’s general authority to institute and operate a parking-control scheme. It did not decide whether this particular scheme was valid, whether its clamping or penalty provisions were lawful, or what powers a landowner possessed to clamp unauthorised vehicles. As the challenge to the council’s authority was the appellant’s only live ground, the appeal failed.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the council possessed statutory authority to operate a parking-control scheme.

2. Court of Appeal: Buxton LJ and Moses J allowed the council’s appeal: [2002] EWCA Civ 582. The district judge could find that the vouchers had been altered, and sections 21(1) of the Housing Act 1985 and 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 supplied sufficient authority for the scheme.

3. County Court: His Honour Judge Cotran rejected the district judge’s findings concerning the vouchers, allowed the tenant’s appeal and adjourned the assessment of damages. He did not determine the validity of the scheme.

4. Shoreditch County Court: The district judge found that the displayed vouchers had been altered and were invalid, and dismissed the tenant’s claim.