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Regina v Soneji and another

[2005] UKHL 49

Case details

Neutral citation
[2005] UKHL 49
Court
House of Lords
Judgment date
21 July 2005
Subjects
Criminal lawConfiscation / Proceeds of crimeStatutory interpretationSentencing
Keywords
confiscationProceeds of Crimesection 71section 72Apostponementmandatory vs directorystatutory constructionabuse of processexceptional circumstancesjurisdiction
Outcome
allowed

Case summary

The House considered the legal consequence of non-compliance with the six-month time-limit for postponement under section 72A(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 when making confiscation orders under section 71. The court rejected a rigid mandatory/directory dichotomy and applied a purposive approach: the key question is whether Parliament intended total invalidity to follow a breach. The House held that a failure to satisfy the requirements of section 72A(3) does not automatically deprive the court of power to make a confiscation order or render such an order void where the court acted in good faith, no prejudice to the defendant is shown and there is no abuse of process. The court also held that there is no residual common law power to postpone confiscation proceedings co-extensive with section 72A and that the expression "exceptional circumstances" must be given a sensible, contextual construction.

Case abstract

The appellants were convicted in the Crown Court of conspiracy to convert and remove the proceeds of criminal conduct. The prosecutor served notice under section 71(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 that confiscation proceedings were appropriate. The sentencing hearings took place before determination of confiscation matters and the court made postponements which, in the view of the Court of Appeal, extended beyond the six month limit in section 72A(3) without any finding of "exceptional circumstances." The Court of Appeal quashed the later confiscation orders on jurisdictional grounds and certified questions for the House.

The House heard argument on (i) whether non-compliance with section 72A(3) automatically invalidated subsequent confiscation orders or deprived the court of jurisdiction, (ii) whether a common law postponement power co-existed with section 72A, and (iii) the meaning of "exceptional circumstances."

The House reviewed the modern approach to statutory requirements, rejecting mechanical reliance on the mandatory/directory distinction and focusing on the consequences of non-compliance and the intention to be imputed to Parliament. Applying that approach, the House concluded that Parliament would not have intended total invalida tion of confiscation orders made in good faith after sentence merely because the six-month limit was exceeded. The court held there was no separate common law postponement power alongside section 72A and that the phrase "exceptional circumstances" should be construed contextually rather than narrowly. The Crown's appeal was allowed and the confiscation orders reinstated.

Relief sought: the Crown sought to restore confiscation orders quashed by the Court of Appeal.

Issues framed: (1) legal effect of non-compliance with section 72A(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; (2) existence of a residual common law power to postpone confiscation; (3) construction of "exceptional circumstances."

Reasoning in brief: The House applied a purposive, consequence-focused statutory interpretation (relying on authorities such as London & Clydeside and Wang) and held that absent bad faith, prejudice or abuse of process Parliament would not intend automatic nullity; section 72A is the exclusive statutory mechanism for postponement and "exceptional circumstances" is to be given a practical meaning.

Held

Appeal allowed. The House held that non-compliance with section 72A(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 does not automatically invalidate subsequent confiscation orders or deprive the court of its duty to make such orders where the court acted in good faith, no prejudice to the defendant is shown and no abuse of process is established. The House also held that there is no separate common law power to postpone confiscation proceedings and that "exceptional circumstances" should be given a contextual, not unduly strict, construction.

Appellate history

Appeal to the House of Lords from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) which had quashed confiscation orders: R v Soneji and Bullen [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 219; earlier proceedings in the Crown Court at Southwark (convictions March–April 2000; sentencing August 2000).

Cited cases

  • Howard v Bodington, (1877) 2 PD 203 neutral
  • Society Promoting Environmental Conservation v Canada (Attorney-General), (2003) 228 DLR (4th) 693 positive
  • Attorney-General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher, [1963] AC 349 neutral
  • London and Clydeside Estates Ltd. v. Aberdeen District Council, [1980] 1 WLR 182 positive
  • R v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council Ex p Hammell, [1989] QB 518 neutral
  • Wang v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [1994] 1 WLR 1286 positive
  • British Columbia (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 2 SCR 41 positive
  • Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council, [1997] QB 306 neutral
  • R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Jeyeanthan, [2000] 1 WLR 354 neutral
  • Attorney-General's Reference (No 3 of 1999), [2001] 2 AC 91 positive
  • Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission v McGillion, [2002] NI 86 neutral
  • Charles v Judicial Legal Service Commission, [2003] 1 LRC 422 positive
  • R v Sekhon, [2003] 1 WLR 1655 neutral
  • R v Ruddick, [2004] 1 Cr App R (S) 52 negative
  • R v Simpson, [2004] QB 118 neutral
  • Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, 1998 194 CLR 355 positive
  • R v Palmer, The Times, 5 November 2002 negative

Legislation cited

  • Criminal Justice Act 1988: Section 71
  • Criminal Justice Act 1988: section 72(1)
  • Criminal Justice Act 1988: Section 72A
  • Criminal Justice Act 1993: Section 28 – s.28
  • Criminal Law Act 1977: Section 1(1)
  • Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000: Section 155(1)/(2)
  • Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: Section 14