Regina v Knights and another

The House of Lords considered whether non-compliance with the procedural requirements of section 72A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended) — in particular the requirement to specify the period of any postponement of confiscation proceedings — deprived the court of jurisdiction to make a confiscation order. The court held that a judge postponing such proceedings must specify the particular period of postponement, but need not specify a precise start or end date for the substantive hearing; it is sufficient to give directions and to fix a date for further listing or final hearing within the timetable. If the timetable as first set makes it likely that the six-month limit in section 72A(3) will be exceeded, the judge must address whether "exceptional circumstances" exist at the time of the initial postponement. A failure in good faith to specify a return date does not automatically render later confiscation proceedings a nullity or deprive the court of jurisdiction provided the judge acted within the apparent scope of section 72A. The court also rejected a challenge based on a defective prosecutor's notice, finding the drafting shortcomings did not invalidate the proceedings.

The appellants were convicted of offences under section 170(1)(b) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 relating to imported cigarettes. Confiscation proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995) were timetabled by the trial judge but were postponed on two occasions, the second postponement taking the matter beyond the six-month limit specified by section 72A(3). The principal issues were whether (i) the judge's initial postponement to a mention date (rather than a specified substantive hearing date) complied with section 72A(1), and (ii) whether any failure to specify the period of postponement deprived the court of jurisdiction to make confiscation orders.

The appellants challenged confiscation orders made after a later hearing on the basis that the initial postponement was invalid because no precise period was specified. The Court of Appeal had considered related authority and the timetabling and had been prepared to uphold reiterative listing as sufficient where it was clear the process would take place within the section 72A timescale. The House of Lords, following the approach taken in the linked Soneji appeal, held that the statutory scheme requires the judge to specify the particular period of postponement (not merely adjourn generally), but that the requirement does not compel specification of the exact hearing date. It is sufficient to give directions for service of statements and to fix a date for further listing or a final hearing, so long as the timetable reflects Parliament's concern about overrunning the six-month limit. If it is likely the six-month limit will be exceeded, exceptional circumstances must be considered at the initial postponement. The court further held that a defective prosecutor's notice did not invalidate proceedings where it was clear the prosecutor intended to give notice under the appropriate provision and where the court would have proceeded regardless.

The appeal was dismissed. The House of Lords held that while a judge must specify the particular period for postponement when using the power in section 72A, he is not required to specify the exact date of the substantive hearing; directions and a further listing or final hearing date within the timetable suffice. If the initial timetable is likely to cause the six-month limit in section 72A(3) to be exceeded, the judge must address exceptional circumstances at that stage. A postponement made in good faith without precise dating does not automatically oust jurisdiction to make a confiscation order. A defective prosecutor's notice did not invalidate the proceedings.

Convictions at Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court (trial concluded October 2000). Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) recorded at [2002] EWCA Crim 2954 and reported at R v Sekhon [2003] 1 WLR 1655. Appeal to the House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 50.