Regina v. Rimmington (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) and Regina v. Goldstein (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))

Criminal public nuisance requires an unwarranted act, or omission to perform a legal duty, which endangers the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or obstructs the exercise of rights common to the public. The conduct must cause, or create an obvious risk of causing, significant injury to a substantial section of the public as a community.

Separate communications harming individual recipients cannot be aggregated into a public nuisance merely because they are numerous. The defendant must know, or have available means of knowing, that the nuisance-causing consequence will result.

Specific statutory offences should ordinarily be charged where they cover the conduct. The common law offence remains available but cannot be enlarged inconsistently with legal certainty or used merely to evade statutory limits.

Regina v Rimmington concerned a charge that the appellant caused a public nuisance by sending 538 racist and offensive postal packages to separate recipients. Following a preparatory hearing, Leveson J ruled that the particulars disclosed an offence known to law and that the prosecution was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Regina v Goldstein concerned salt placed as a joke in an envelope addressed to a friend. The salt escaped during sorting, prompting evacuation of a postal sorting office and cancellation of a delivery. A jury convicted the appellant of public nuisance.

The Court of Appeal heard the appeals together and dismissed both: [2003] EWCA Crim 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878 and [2004] 1 Cr App R 388. The House considered the essential public element of the offence, its compatibility with legal certainty, its relationship with statutory offences, and the necessary mens rea.

1. Disposition. Lord Bingham delivered the leading speech. Lord Nicholls, Lord Rodger, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown agreed that both appeals should be allowed. Mr Goldstein’s conviction was quashed.
2. The public element. Per Lord Bingham, the distinguishing feature of public nuisance is common injury. An unwarranted act, or omission to discharge a legal duty, must endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or obstruct the public in exercising rights common to all. The conduct must affect the community, or a substantial section of it, as a whole. Separate injuries to individual recipients do not acquire this quality merely through repetition. The House rejected the contrary approach in R v Norbury and R v Johnson (Anthony).
3. Legal certainty. Per Lord Bingham, the orthodox offence is sufficiently clear for the common law and article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A person can ask whether the contemplated conduct is likely to inflict significant injury on a substantial section of the public exercising public rights. Courts cannot create offences or extend an existing offence by analogy in a manner inconsistent with its essence or not reasonably foreseeable. The expanded line of authority concerning repeated communications lacked the necessary clarity because it detached the offence from common injury.
4. Statutory offences. Per Lord Bingham, the courts cannot abolish public nuisance; that is a matter for Parliament. Its proper future use will nevertheless be rare because legislation now covers much of its former field. Good practice and respect for the primacy of statute ordinarily require conduct within a specific statutory offence to be prosecuted under that provision unless good reason exists. Lord Rodger added that the common law should not be selected deliberately to evade statutory time limits or sentencing limits.
5. The appeals. Per Lord Bingham, the packages attributed to Mr Rimmington caused separate injuries to individuals rather than common injury to a section of the public. The particulars therefore lacked an essential ingredient of public nuisance. In Mr Goldstein’s case, the required mens rea was knowledge, or available means of knowledge, that the nuisance-causing consequence would occur. The relevant event was the unintended escape of salt, not merely the disruption foreseeable if an escape occurred. The prosecution had not proved that he knew or reasonably should have known that the salt would escape.
6. Hoax messages and reporting. Lord Nicholls, supported on this point by Lord Rodger and Lord Brown, observed that a message to one recipient may constitute public nuisance if it is intended to be relayed so as to cause public alarm and disruption. Lord Bingham also ordered under section 37(5) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 that the reporting restriction should not apply. Criminal defendants should not be anonymised without good reason and statutory authority.

1. House of Lords: Both appeals were allowed unanimously. The House held that the particulars against Mr Rimmington lacked the necessary common injury and quashed Mr Goldstein’s conviction: [2005] UKHL 63.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The conjoined appeals were dismissed: [2003] EWCA Crim 3450, [2004] 1 WLR 2878 and [2004] 1 Cr App R 388.
3. Crown Court: At the Central Criminal Court, Leveson J ruled at a preparatory hearing that the indictment against Mr Rimmington charged a recognised offence and was not an abuse of process. At the Crown Court at Southwark, Mr Goldstein was convicted by a jury of public nuisance.