Regina v Rimmington

The House considered the definition and essential ingredients of the common law offence of causing a public nuisance and the mens rea required for conviction. The court reaffirmed that a public nuisance must cause a common injury to the public or to a significant section of the public (the "requirement of common injury"). It rejected recent authority that treated a series of isolated acts directed at different individuals as cumulatively amounting to a public nuisance (notably the Norbury/Johnson line) because that approach converted separate private wrongs into a public offence and undermined legal certainty under article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The House accepted the mens rea test as stated in R v Shorrock: liability may arise where the defendant knew or ought to have known (because means of knowledge were available) that his acts would result in the nuisance. Applying these principles, the court held that (a) the conduct alleged against Mr Rimmington—numerous racially offensive postal packages sent to separate individuals—did not establish the requisite common injury and thus did not disclose the common law crime of public nuisance, and (b) Mr Goldstein lacked the requisite knowledge or means of knowledge that salt would escape from the posted envelope and produce the disruption alleged; his conviction was therefore unsafe. The court further emphasised that where Parliament has enacted specific statutory offences covering particular conduct, those statutory provisions should ordinarily be used rather than the general common law offence.

Background and parties:

• R v Rimmington: indictment alleging between 25 May 1992 and 13 June 2001 the appellant sent 538 postal packages containing racially offensive material to members of the public, causing annoyance, harassment, alarm or distress. The Crown proceeded for the common law offence of public nuisance. A preparatory hearing under section 29 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 had been held; Leveson J ruled the indictment char ged an offence known to the law. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defence challenge ([2003] EWCA Crim 3450).
• R v Goldstein: indictment alleging that between 16 and 20 October 2001 the appellant caused a public nuisance by posting an envelope containing salt to a postal sorting office which leaked, caused fear of anthrax, evacuation and cancellation of a delivery. He was convicted in the Crown Court and sentenced to a community punishment order; appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

Nature of the claim and procedural posture:

• Both appeals reached the House of Lords raising whether the common law offence of public nuisance, as currently understood and applied, is sufficiently certain to satisfy common law principles and article 7 ECHR; whether the offence still has practical application given extensive statutory regulation; and what mens rea is required.

Issues framed by the court:

1. Whether public nuisance requires a common injury to the public or a significant section of it, as opposed to the aggregation of separate harms to individual victims.
2. Whether the modern case law that treated series of individual communications (e.g. obscene calls/letters) as a public nuisance was consistent with legal certainty and the Convention.
3. The appropriate mens rea for public nuisance.
4. Whether, where Parliament has enacted statutory offences covering the conduct, the Crown may still charge the common law offence to avoid statutory limits (time bars or sentencing limits).

Court’s reasoning and conclusions:

• The House examined historical and modern authorities and definitions and concluded that the core requirement of public nuisance is that the act or omission causes common injury or endangers rights enjoyed by the public as such. Definitions in treatises and codes were reviewed and the court found the "requirement of common injury" central.
• The court rejected the extension of the offence in Norbury, Johnson and related authorities that allowed cumulative private harms (telephone calls, letters) to be treated as public nuisance. That approach altered the essential elements of the offence to the detriment of defendants and raised Convention concerns about vagueness and retrospective criminalisation. Those lines of authority were disapproved.
• The court accepted the mens rea approach in R v Shorrock that liability may arise where the defendant knew or ought to have known (i.e. the means of knowledge were available) that his acts would create the nuisance, but that this must be applied to facts that actually disclose a public nuisance.
• Applying these principles, the House held that: Mr Rimmington’s campaign of sending offensive packages to separate individuals did not amount to a common injury to a section of the public and therefore did not disclose the common law offence; Mr Goldstein did not know and had no means of knowing that salt would escape and cause the particular disruption alleged, so his conviction could not stand.
• The court emphasised that statutory offences now cover many matters formerly prosecuted as public nuisance and that prosecutors should not use the common law to circumvent statutory time limits or sentencing schemes; law reform, if required, is for Parliament.

Relief sought and disposition:

• The appellants sought quashing of convictions. The House allowed both appeals and quashed the convictions for public nuisance.

Appeals allowed. The House held that the common law offence of public nuisance requires a common injury to the public or a significant section of it and cannot properly be extended to aggregate separate private harms directed at individuals; the Norbury/Johnson line was disapproved. The mens rea recognised in R v Shorrock (the defendant knew or ought to have known because means of knowledge were available) was accepted but was not established against Goldstein. Consequently Rimmington's indictment did not disclose public nuisance and Goldstein lacked the requisite mens rea; both convictions were quashed. The court further stated that statutory offences should ordinarily be used where Parliament has prescribed them and prosecutors must not use the common law to evade statutory time limits or sentencing restrictions.

Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) which had dismissed the appellants' challenges: [2003] EWCA Crim 3450; reported at [2004] 1 WLR 2878; appeals allowed by the House of Lords in [2005] UKHL 63.