PRP Architects v Reid

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' challenge to a first instance finding that the employer was liable for personal injuries under Regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. The court held that the lift in the common parts of the building was "work equipment" and, on the facts, was being "used at work" by the employee when she was injured while leaving the premises at the end of the working day. The decision turned on the statutory definition of "work equipment", the phrase "used by an employee at work" in Regulation 3(2) and the factual finding that the lift served as the natural means of access to and egress from the employer's premises and was used in the course of employment.

The court rejected submissions that the Regulations could not apply to equipment outside the employer's demised premises where the employer did not have exclusive control, and considered but did not accept alternative bases of liability under the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 or the Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 on the facts before it. The appeal was dismissed.

Background and parties: The respondent, a receptionist employed by PRP Architects, was injured when a lift door trapped her hand in the common lobby of the building containing the appellant's offices. The appellant occupied suite B under a lease and paid service charges contributing to lift repair, but the lift formed part of the building's common parts.

Procedural posture: This was an appeal from the Central London County Court (Her Honour Judge Faber). The trial below addressed liability only; the judge found a breach of Regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 and awarded damages. The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Nature of claim and issues: The respondent relied on breach of statutory duty under Regulation 5 of the 1998 Regulations. Pleaded alternative grounds included breaches of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 and liability under Section 1 of the Employers Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969. The primary issues were whether the lift constituted "work equipment" within Regulation 2 and whether it was being "used at work" within Regulation 3(2) when the respondent was injured. Secondary issues included whether the Workplace Regulations or the 1969 Act provided alternative bases of liability.

Court's reasoning: The court accepted that "work equipment" should be given a broad construction and that an "installation" can include a lift. The decisive question was whether the lift was being used "at work." The court considered the territorial and control-related implications of that phrase, its relationship to the 1974 Act definition of "at work" and relevant authorities including Armstrong Whitworth. On the facts the lift was the natural means of access and egress to the appellant's premises, the lease expressly included rights to use the lift and obligations as to repair via service charge provisions, and the employee also used the lift in the course of running errands for her employer. Considering those features together, the court concluded the lift was being used at work by the respondent when injured, so Regulation 3(2) and Regulation 5 applied and the appellant was in breach.

Subsidiary findings and wider context: The court noted the potential breadth of an employer's duty under a literal reading of the Directive-derived Regulations but declined to accept arguments that would impose an absolute territorial liability in all circumstances. It rejected a finding of control sufficient to attract the Workplace Regulations on the facts and held that the 1969 Act claim was not available because negligence at common law had not been pursued. The court emphasised that general principles in this area are fact-sensitive and should be developed incrementally.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that the lift in the building's common parts was "work equipment" and, on the facts, was being "used at work" by the employee when injured; therefore Regulation 3(2) and Regulation 5(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 applied and the appellants were in breach. The court declined to impose liability under the Workplace Regulations on the facts and held the 1969 Act claim was not available as negligence at common law had not been pursued.

Appeal from the Central London County Court (Her Honour Judge Faber) where the respondent succeeded on liability under Regulation 5 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (trial on liability only). This judgment was given by the Court of Appeal, neutral citation [2006] EWCA Civ 1119.