Regina v Longworth

The House of Lords held that section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 operates to deem a conviction in respect of which an offender is discharged absolutely or conditionally not to be a conviction "for any purpose" other than the proceedings in which the discharge is made. Consequently, a sentencing judge had no power to determine, as part of sentencing, that the offender was subject to the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 or to order him to sign the sex offenders register. The judge's ruling and that part of the certificate of conviction were set aside.

The court reached this conclusion by construing the statutory scheme: the duty to notify and the criminal sanction for non-compliance are imposed independently by the 1997 Act, so such matters fall outside the narrow phrase "the purposes of the proceedings" in s.14(1) of the 2000 Act. The subsequent Sexual Offences Act 2003 confirmed the interpretative approach by expressly disapplying s.14(1) for conditional discharges after its commencement, which the Lords treated as indicating Parliament's assumption that s.14(1) otherwise excluded notification requirements for discharges before that commencement.

Background and facts.

• The appellant pleaded guilty to making and possessing indecent photographs of children (Protection of Children Act 1978 s.1(1)(a) and Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.160(1)). At re‑arraignment the trial judge indicated an intention to impose conditional discharges and adjourned sentence to consider whether that would trigger notification requirements under the Sex Offenders Act 1997. On 12 January 2004 the judge imposed concurrent conditional discharges for 12 months and ruled that the appellant was required to register under the 1997 Act for five years. The judge certified the case as fit for appeal.

Procedural history. The Court of Appeal (Crim Div) heard an appeal and dismissed it. The appellant obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords; the certified question asked whether s.14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 prevents a conditional discharge from being treated as a conviction for the purposes of the Sex Offenders Act 1997.

Issues framed by the court.

1. Whether s.14(1) of the 2000 Act prevents a conviction resulting in a conditional discharge from being treated as a conviction for the purposes of the notification requirements in s.1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997.
2. Whether the sentencing judge had power, as part of sentencing under the 1978 and 1988 Acts, to determine the existence or duration of any registration obligation under the 1997 Act and to order the offender to register.

Court’s reasoning.

• The phrase "the purposes of the proceedings" in s.14(1) is to be read narrowly and refers to the legal proceedings before the court and what significance a conviction has within those proceedings (guilt and sentencing). The notification duty and criminal sanction for failure to notify derive independently from the 1997 Act and any prosecution for non‑compliance would require separate proceedings under s.3 of that Act.
• Because the 1997 Act contains no express provision excluding the effect of s.14(1), and Parliament in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 later expressly disapplied s.14(1) for conditional discharges from the date Part 2 commenced, the better reading is that s.14(1) of the 2000 Act does prevent reliance on a conviction resulting in a conditional discharge for the purposes of the 1997 Act, where the discharge occurred before the 2003 Act's relevant commencement.
• The trial judge therefore had no power to rule, as part of sentencing, that the appellant must register; that ruling was beyond power and should be set aside. The House nevertheless answered the certified question in the affirmative, confirming that s.14(1) has the effect contended for by the appellant.

Relief sought. The appellant sought to overturn the judge's ruling requiring registration and to determine the certified question of law. The House allowed the appeal and set aside the relevant part of the sentencing remarks and certificate.

Appeal allowed. The House held that s.14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 means that a conviction in respect of which a conditional discharge is made is to be treated as not being a conviction "for any purpose" outside the proceedings in which the discharge is made; the sentencing judge therefore lacked power to require the appellant to register under the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and that part of his sentence was set aside. The House also relied on the legislative history, notably the Sexual Offences Act 2003, to confirm Parliament's understanding of the effect of s.14(1).

Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2004] EWCA Crim 2145; original sentence and ruling made by HHJ Hale in the Warrington Crown Court on 12 January 2004. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted and the appeal was allowed.