Regina v. Longworth (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))

A notification obligation imposed automatically by statute is a consequence of conviction, rather than part of the sentence. A sentencing court may inform an offender of such an obligation, but it cannot determine or order compliance as part of its sentence.

Under section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the purposes of the proceedings are confined to the legal proceedings actually before the court. A conviction followed by a conditional discharge was therefore deemed not to be a conviction for the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. An unauthorised order made during sentencing remains effective until set aside and may be challenged on appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court to making and possessing indecent photographs of children. The judge imposed conditional discharges but also ruled that the appellant had to comply for five years with the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 1997. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal in [2004] EWCA Crim 2145.

The appeal raised two connected questions. The first was whether the sentencing judge had power to determine and order compliance with a notification obligation arising independently under the 1997 Act. The second was whether section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 deemed a conviction followed by a conditional discharge not to be a conviction for the purposes of the 1997 Act.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Mance delivered the leading speech. Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Rodger agreed with his reasons. Lord Hope agreed that the judge lacked power to require registration and that section 14(1) prevented the conviction from supporting the notification requirement.

2. Per Lord Mance, the notification duty under section 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 arose, if at all, automatically by force of that Act. It did not arise from the legislation creating the underlying offences or from any order available to the sentencing court. The judge therefore had no power to determine the existence or duration of the duty or to order the appellant to register.

3. The purported ruling was nevertheless appealable. It had been made objectively as part of the sentencing exercise and was recorded as part of the sentence. Applying R v Cain [1985] AC 46, an order made in excess of the Crown Court's power is not a nullity which may simply be disregarded. It stands until set aside by the court or an appellate tribunal.

4. Section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 states a general principle and gives a narrow meaning to “the purposes of the proceedings”. Those purposes were to determine guilt and, following guilt, the appropriate punishment for the offences charged. They did not include an independently imposed notification duty or a later prosecution for failure to notify. The conviction followed by conditional discharge was consequently deemed not to be a conviction for section 1(1)(a) of the 1997 Act.

5. The absence from the 1997 Act of an express exclusion of section 14(1), together with the structure of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, confirmed that conclusion. The House rejected the submission that “conviction” meant the date of sentence. The statutory notification period ordinarily began on conviction because the protective duty was intended to arise immediately.

6. The judge's purported notification order was set aside without converting it into a valid sentencing order. Courts may inform offenders of statutory notification consequences, but should not present that information as part of the sentence or as a further judicial order.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the appeal unanimously and set aside the part of the sentencing ruling which purported to require registration. The certified question concerning section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 was answered in the affirmative.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2004] EWCA Crim 2145, dismissed the appeal from the Crown Court's ruling that the appellant was subject to the notification requirements.
3. Warrington Crown Court: Imposed twelve-month conditional discharges and purported to require compliance for five years with the notification requirements of the Sex Offenders Act 1997.