Jones v. Whalley

The House of Lords allowed the appeal and held that a private prosecution may be stayed as an abuse of process where the defendant had accepted a formal police caution on the express assurance that he "would not have to go before a criminal court in connection with this matter." The court treated the police caution, given in accordance with national standards (Home Office Circular 18/1994), as a decision that prosecution was not in the public interest which should be respected while it stood, subject to any successful judicial review. The Lords decided the case on this narrower ground and declined to determine the broader question whether a valid formal caution automatically precludes any subsequent private prosecution absent quashing by judicial review.

Background and facts:

• On 17 May 2003 the appellant, Mr Whalley, assaulted the respondent, Mr Jones. Upon interview by Greater Manchester Police, Mr Whalley admitted the offence and was given a formal police caution on a standard form which stated he "will not have to go before a criminal court in connection with this matter."
• On 22 December 2003 Mr Jones, acting as a private prosecutor, laid an information charging assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Procedural history:

• The justices at St Helens concluded the private prosecution would be an abuse of process and stayed proceedings.
• On appeal by case stated the Divisional Court (Sedley LJ and Beatson J) reversed and held that administration and acceptance of a caution did not preclude a private prosecution ([2005] EWHC 931 (Admin)).
• The matter proceeded to the House of Lords.

Issues before the House:

• Whether the private prosecution commenced by Mr Jones was an abuse of the process of the magistrates' court in light of Mr Whalley having accepted a formal caution on the assurance he would not go to court.
• Whether, more broadly, the right of private prosecution can survive the implementation of a formal cautioning procedure (the House did not decide this broader question).

Reasoning and disposition:

• The Lords analysed the non-statutory national standards for cautioning (Home Office Circular 18/1994), the statutory schemes for reprimands/warnings (Crime and Disorder Act 1998) and conditional cautions (Criminal Justice Act 2003), and authorities on abuse of process (notably R v Croydon Justices, Ex p Dean and R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, Ex p Bennett).
• The court concluded on the narrower ground that where a person has been induced to accept a formal caution by an assurance that he will not be prosecuted, it is an abuse of process for a private prosecutor to proceed while that caution stands; the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved private prosecutor would be to seek judicial review of the police decision to caution if he disputes it.
• The House therefore set aside the Divisional Court, upheld the justices' stay and dismissed the proceedings against Mr Whalley. The broader submission that any caution (unless quashed) automatically bars private prosecution was not decided and was left for fuller argument or possible legislation.

Appeal allowed. The House held (on the narrower ground) that it was an abuse of the magistrates' court process to permit a private prosecution to proceed where the defendant had accepted a formal police caution on the express assurance that he would not have to go before a criminal court; the Divisional Court's contrary decision was set aside and the justices' stay was upheld. The House declined to decide the broader question whether a caution, absent quashing, always precludes private prosecution.

Justices at St Helens stayed the private prosecution. The Divisional Court (Sedley LJ and Beatson J) allowed an appeal by case stated and held the prosecution was not an abuse ([2005] EWHC 931 (Admin)). The House of Lords allowed the further appeal and set aside the Divisional Court's decision ([2006] UKHL 41).