Case details
Summary
A particular social group under article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 comprises persons sharing a characteristic independent of persecution, or persons perceived by society as a group. The characteristic will often be innate, unchangeable or fundamental to identity or human rights.
A family may constitute such a group. Persecution of a family member may have the necessary Convention nexus even if the person who first attracted the persecutor’s attention was not targeted for a Convention reason. The Convention ground need only be an effective reason for the feared persecution.
Women subjected to institutionalised gender inequality may also form a particular social group. The group need not be confined to every person presently at risk. Female genital mutilation may constitute persecution for reasons of membership of that group, notwithstanding its widespread social acceptance or performance by women.
Factual background
These conjoined appeals concerned two women whom the Secretary of State accepted could not be returned consistently with article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v K, an Iranian woman had been raped and threatened by state agents after her husband’s detention. An adjudicator recognised her as a refugee because she was persecuted as a member of her husband’s family. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal reversed that decision, and the Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal in [2004] EWCA Civ 986.
In Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a young Sierra Leonean woman feared enforced female genital mutilation. An adjudicator allowed her asylum appeal, but the Tribunal reversed that decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal by a majority in [2005] EWCA Civ 680, [2005] 1 WLR 3773.
The common issue was whether each woman feared persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group within article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.
Held
Both appeals were allowed unanimously. The Court of Appeal and Immigration Appeal Tribunal orders were set aside, and the adjudicators’ decisions recognising the appellants’ asylum claims were restored.
Lord Bingham delivered the leading speech. Baroness Hale agreed with his reasons, Lord Brown was in substantial agreement with all the speeches, and Lord Hope and Lord Rodger agreed in allowing both appeals. A particular social group may be identified through either a shared characteristic independent of persecution or society’s perception of the persons as a group. The characteristic will commonly be innate, unchangeable or fundamental to identity, conscience or human rights. The group need not be cohesive. Persecution may make an independently defined group more visible.
Per Lord Bingham, the Convention ground need not be the sole or primary reason for persecution. It is sufficient that it is an effective reason. The decision-maker must identify the real reason for the feared persecution by considering all relevant circumstances. A simple “but for” test and an inquiry confined to the persecutor’s professed motive are inappropriate.
In K’s appeal, Lord Bingham, Lord Hope, Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale held that a family can constitute a particular social group. The claimant must be assessed in her own right. It is unnecessary to prove that the family member who initially attracted attention was persecuted for a Convention reason, or that other family members face the same danger. The adjudicator was entitled to find that K faced persecution because she was her detained husband’s wife. The contrary rule in Quijano [1997] Imm AR 227 was overruled, while the reasoning in De Melo [1997] Imm AR 43 was approved.
In Fornah’s appeal, the narrowest common basis was that uninitiated indigenous females in Sierra Leone formed a particular social group. Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale also regarded Sierra Leonean women, or women from ethnic groups practising female genital mutilation, as a valid wider group. Lord Hope and Lord Brown preferred the narrower formulation, while accepting that the wider formulation was legally available. The group existed independently of the feared mutilation because its members shared gender, nationality, ethnicity or intactness.
Female genital mutilation was persecutory treatment and an extreme expression of institutionalised gender inequality. Its widespread acceptance did not deprive it of that character. Nor did its performance by women prevent it from being persecution. The state’s inability or unwillingness to protect the victim completed the claim where the Convention nexus was established.
Lord Bingham considered that article 10 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC should not be read as requiring both protected characteristics and social perception in every case. Lord Brown agreed that the Directive had to be interpreted consistently with the alternative criteria in the UNHCR definition.
The parties, other than the intervener, were invited to make written submissions on costs within 14 days.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- House of Lords: In Fornah (Zainab Esther) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (K v Secretary of State for the Home Department) [2006] UKHL 46, both appeals were allowed. The Court of Appeal and Tribunal orders were set aside, and both adjudicators’ decisions were restored.
- Court of Appeal—K: In [2004] EWCA Civ 986, the court upheld the Tribunal’s reversal of the adjudicator’s decision because it regarded itself as bound by Quijano.
- Court of Appeal—Fornah: In [2005] EWCA Civ 680, [2005] 1 WLR 3773, the majority upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that the proposed group was not a particular social group. Arden LJ dissented.
- Immigration Appeal Tribunal: In each appeal, the Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and reversed the adjudicator’s recognition of the claimant as a refugee.
- Adjudicators: Each adjudicator found a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group and upheld the respective asylum claim.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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