Bruce, R (on the application of) v Financial Ombudsman Services Ltd & Ors

The claimant sought judicial review of a determination of the Financial Ombudsman Service arising from alleged mis‑selling of a personal pension in 1988. Central legal issues were whether the DISP procedures and the requirements of natural justice (including an opportunity to make representations) had been breached and whether former partners of a dissolved partnership were given adequate notice.

The court held that the Ombudsman acted within the informal dispute‑resolution scheme created by section 225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the DISP rules (notably DISP 3 and provisions 3.2.1, 3.2.7, 3.2.11 and 3.2.12). The former partners were on notice and had opportunities to make representations; late evidence was excluded; and no arguable basis was shown that a re‑investigation would produce a different outcome. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background and parties: The claimant, Mrs Alison Ruth Bruce, was a former partner of Bruce & Partners, a firm found by the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) to have mis‑sold a personal pension to Mr Duncan Henderson in 1988. The FOS directed the former partners (including the claimant) to pay the assessed loss into the complainant's pension policy. Mrs Bruce brought judicial review challenging the lawfulness of that decision on grounds including breach of natural justice and non‑compliance with the DISP rules.

Procedural posture: Permission for judicial review was granted by Kenneth Parker QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 6 December (date as stated in the judgment). This hearing was a first‑instance Administrative Court determination of the application for judicial review.

Relief sought: The claimant sought to quash the Ombudsman’s determination and to challenge the process by which the decision and the loss assessment were reached.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the FOS breached the DISP procedures and the requirements of natural justice by failing to give the claimant (and other former partners) adequate notice and opportunity to make representations during the investigatory and provisional assessment stages;
• Whether service to the address used was effective for the claimant and whether any service defect rendered the decision unlawful;
• Whether late evidence (a witness statement from Mr David Bruce) should be admitted; and
• Whether there was any arguable basis on which a re‑investigation might produce a different result.

Court’s reasoning and conclusions: The court accepted that the statutory scheme under section 225 FSMA contemplates an informal, minimum‑formality process and that DISP 3 governs complaint handling. The Ombudsman’s investigatory process was judged to cover the stages relied upon by the defendant; the former partners were treated as jointly and severally liable and had opportunities to make representations. The claimant’s complaint that she had not been involved earlier was undermined by evidence about service and by indications that she avoided engagement. Late evidence from Mr David Bruce was excluded as irrelevant and overdue. Critically, the claimant failed to show any basis upon which a reinvestigation would be likely to produce a different decision. For these reasons the court dismissed the application for judicial review.

Wider context: The court noted the informal character of the FOS scheme under FSMA but emphasised that informality does not permit denial of effective opportunity to respond; here the procedural conduct did not amount to unlawfulness.

The claim is dismissed. The court held that the Financial Ombudsman Service acted within the informal dispute‑resolution scheme under section 225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and in accordance with the DISP complaint‑handling procedures. Former partners were on notice and had opportunity to make representations; the claimant did not demonstrate a breach of natural justice or of DISP that would render the decision unlawful, and no basis was shown that a re‑investigation would produce a different result. Late evidence was refused as inadmissible.

Permission for judicial review was granted by Kenneth Parker QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 6 December (date given in the judgment). No further appellate history is stated in the judgment.