Dabas (Appellant) v. High Court of Justice, Madrid (Respondent) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)

Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 must, so far as its language permits, be construed in the light of the wording and purpose of the European arrest warrant Framework Decision. A signed European arrest warrant may itself be the certificate required by section 64(2)(b) and (c). No separate document or use of the word “certify” is required where the issuing judicial officer authenticates the warrant and accepts responsibility for its accuracy.

The mandatory statements required by section 2(2) cannot be supplied by extraneous information. Once a valid Part 1 warrant exists, the judge may seek urgent supplementary information. For double criminality, the relevant conduct is the conduct for which surrender is sought, rather than earlier events included as background. The warrant need not reproduce the text of foreign law.

The High Court of Justice in Madrid issued a European arrest warrant seeking the surrender of the appellant to face a charge of collaboration with an Islamist terrorist organisation arising from the Madrid train bombings. A district judge at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court ordered his extradition.

The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court dismissed his statutory appeal: [2006] EWHC 971 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 145. On appeal to the House of Lords, the appellant contended that the warrant lacked the certificate required by section 64(2) of the Extradition Act 2003, that some alleged conduct pre-dated the corresponding United Kingdom offence, and that the warrant should have reproduced or otherwise made available the relevant Spanish law.

The principal issue was whether the signed European arrest warrant could itself constitute the section 64(2)(b) and (c) certificate.

1. Disposition. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lord Bingham, Lord Hope, Lord Brown and Lord Mance held that the signed European arrest warrant was itself capable of constituting the certificate required by section 64(2)(b) and (c) of the Extradition Act 2003. Lord Scott dissented on that issue alone, but agreed that the appeal failed under section 64(3).

2. Conforming interpretation. Lord Hope gave the principal detailed opinion. Part 1 of the 2003 Act had to be construed, so far as possible, consistently with the wording and objectives of the European arrest warrant Framework Decision. Those objectives included mutual recognition, judicial cooperation and swift surrender without the complexity and delay of former extradition procedures. The interpretative obligation recognised in Criminal proceedings against Pupino [2005] EUECJ C-105/03 did not permit a construction contrary to the statute.

3. The certificate. The certificate requirement was an important safeguard because section 64(2) removed verification of double criminality. Its purpose was to vouch for the accuracy of the required information, rather than to add information already contained in the warrant. A document need not use the word “certify”. The Spanish judge’s signature authenticated the warrant and demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for its contents. Requiring an additional document would introduce a formality absent from the Framework Decision and impede its intended uniform operation.

4. Mandatory warrant contents and supplementary information. Lord Hope stated that a judge may request urgent supplementary information and adjourn an extradition hearing where the information presented is insufficient. The warrant must first satisfy section 2(2). A failure to include its mandatory statements cannot be cured by extraneous information.

5. Double criminality and foreign law. Lord Hope said that the remaining certified questions did not arise for decision once section 64(2) was satisfied, but answered them because of their public importance. The other Law Lords agreed with his conclusions. The relevant conduct must have been criminal under United Kingdom law at the time it allegedly occurred. Earlier events included only as background do not form part of that conduct. Where necessary, the judge may seek a temporal limitation of the warrant or reflect such a limitation in the order. Section 2(4)(c) requires the nature and legal classification of the foreign offence, not the text of foreign law. The judge need not examine that text when applying section 64(3).

6. Lord Scott’s dissent. Lord Scott considered that section 64(2) clearly required a separate and express judicial certificate. In his view, neither the Framework Decision nor Pupino justified removing a safeguard deliberately enacted by Parliament. He nevertheless dismissed the appeal because section 64(3) was satisfied.

1. House of Lords: By [2007] UKHL 6, unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the surrender order. The certificate issue was decided by a four-to-one majority.

2. Queen’s Bench Divisional Court: Latham LJ and Jack J dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the district judge: [2006] EWHC 971 (Admin); [2007] 1 WLR 145.

3. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court: On 17 November 2005, District Judge Anthony Evans ordered the appellant’s extradition to Spain.