Beasley v National Grid

Where an employment tribunal excludes an unfair-dismissal claim as out of time, it should give a full and proper explanation under Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111(2), including whether presentation within time was reasonably practicable. The tribunal should consider the whole limitation period and all material circumstances, rather than treating a very short delay as automatically determinative. Where exclusion prevents a merits hearing, the adequacy of the tribunal’s reasoning engages access to justice. In an extreme case, it may be inappropriate for an appellate court to infer the necessary reasoning merely by reading between the lines.

The appellant challenged the refusal to entertain his unfair-dismissal complaint against National Grid. The Employment Tribunal at Reading held that it had no jurisdiction because the ET1 was presented outside the three-month period in Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111. The Employment Appeal Tribunal, on 6 August 2007, dismissed his appeal, and Silber J refused permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Pill LJ subsequently refused permission on the papers.

The ET1 was submitted approximately 88 seconds after midnight at the end of the three-month period. The appellant relied on conflicting advice, difficulties completing the electronic form and a mistaken email address. The central issue was whether the tribunal had adequately considered reasonable practicability and explained its conclusion in accordance with Meek v Birmingham City Council.

1. Application adjourned. Lord Justice Wall adjourned the renewed application for permission to appeal to a full Court of Appeal, with the appeal to follow if permission were granted. The court did not determine the substantive limitation issue.
2. The proposed appeal raised an arguable question whether the tribunal had erred in law by failing to address expressly, or sufficiently, the statutory question whether it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within the three-month period under Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111(2)(b).
3. Although the EAT considered that the tribunal’s reasoning could be reconstructed by reading between the lines, it was arguable that, on these extreme facts, that approach was inappropriate. The tribunal’s reasons did not expressly mention reasonable practicability and appeared not to engage with all relevant circumstances, including the appellant’s conduct during the three-month period, his good faith, the conflicting advice and the technical difficulties encountered shortly before expiry.
4. Where a litigant is denied access to a merits hearing because a claim is out of time, the tribunal should provide a full and proper explanation of why the statutory exception does not apply. The court also considered it arguable that Marks and Spencer v William-Ryan had not been fully or properly considered.
5. The application was to be listed before three judges, at least two of whom should have experience in the EAT. No expedition was required.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the renewed permission application was adjourned to a full court, with the appeal to follow if permission were granted.
2. Court of Appeal (on the papers): Pill LJ refused permission on 22 November 2007.
3. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Silber J dismissed the appeal against the Employment Tribunal’s decision and refused permission to appeal on 13 September 2007.
4. Employment Tribunal at Reading: Mrs J Hill held that the tribunal had no jurisdiction because the ET1 was presented outside the three-month period under Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111.