Corr (Administratix of the Estate of Thomas Corr (Deceased)) v IBC Vehicles Limited

The House held that death by suicide of an employee may be a compensable consequence of the employer's negligence under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 where psychiatric injury caused by the employer's breach led to suicide. The court applied established causation and remoteness principles (as summarised in Simmons v British Steel plc) and treated psychiatric injury as a form of personal injury for which the defendant must "take his victim as he finds him" (see Page v Smith). The suicide was not a novus actus interveniens where it was the direct product of a severe depressive illness caused by the accident, and defences of volenti and unreasonable conduct did not independently defeat liability. On contributory negligence the House declined, on the material before it, to make a deduction but recognised in principle that, depending on the degree to which the deceased's autonomy remained, a reduction could be appropriate.

This was an appeal by an employer against a Court of Appeal decision allowing a dependant's claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 for loss attributable to the suicide of an employee who had been severely injured at work.

Background and facts:

• Mr Thomas Corr, then about 31, suffered severe disfiguring head injuries in a workplace machine accident on 22 June 1996 caused by the employer's admitted breach of duty.
• He developed chronic physical and psychiatric conditions, notably a severe depressive episode and post-traumatic stress symptoms, and eventually committed suicide on 23 May 2002. It was common ground that the depression was caused by the accident and that the depression drove the suicide.
• Proceedings were begun by Mr Corr (personal injury claim) and amended after his death: his administratrix claimed both (a) damages for the estate under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and (b) dependent's damages under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 for loss attributable to the suicide. Only the latter was in issue on this appeal.

Procedural history: First instance: deputy judge (Mr Nigel Baker QC) held the suicide was not reasonably foreseeable and rejected the Fatal Accidents Act claim. Court of Appeal ([2006] EWCA Civ 331, reported [2007] QB 46) allowed the claimant's appeal. The employer appealed to the House of Lords.

Issues before the House:

• Whether the deceased's suicide was "caused" by the employer's wrongful act within section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (issues framed as scope of duty, foreseeability/remoteness, novus actus interveniens and unreasonable conduct);
• Whether the defences volenti non fit injuria or contributory negligence should bar or reduce recovery under the 1976 Act.

Court's reasoning and conclusions:

• The House accepted the parties' concession that the employer owed a duty of care including psychiatric injury and that the breach caused the accident and the subsequent depression.
• On foreseeability/remoteness the court applied contemporary causation principles (Simmons v British Steel plc) and Page v Smith: where physical injury was a foreseeable consequence of negligence the defendant must take the victim as found; it is not necessary to prove that suicide specifically was foreseeable. Given that severe depression was a foreseeable consequence of the accident and that suicide is a not-uncommon sequel of such depression, the suicide fell within the foreseeable consequences and was not too remote.
• The suicide was not a novus actus interveniens because it was a direct outcome of the psychiatric illness caused by the employer. The courts should not require the blunt M'Naghten insanity test to be met before liability can arise.
• Arguments based on voluntary unreasonable conduct and volenti failed for the same reasons: the suicide was produced by the employer-induced depression and so those doctrines did not independently absolve liability.
• On contributory negligence the House declined to make a finding (or reduction) on the limited material before it, while recognising as a matter of principle that some apportionment may be appropriate in other cases depending on the degree to which the deceased's autonomy was impaired (a spectrum ranging from wholly sound mind to effectively no autonomy).

Appeal dismissed. The House held that the employer was liable under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 for loss attributable to the deceased's suicide because the suicide was a direct consequence of severe depressive illness caused by the employer's admitted negligence; the suicide was not a novus actus interveniens, and defences of volenti and unreasonable conduct did not negate liability. The House declined on the material before it to reduce damages for contributory negligence.

First instance: Deputy Judge (Mr Nigel Baker QC) found the suicide not reasonably foreseeable and dismissed the Fatal Accidents Act claim. Court of Appeal: [2006] EWCA Civ 331 (reported [2007] QB 46) allowed the claimant's appeal. House of Lords on further appeal: [2008] UKHL 13, appeal dismissed.