Wellington R (On the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The House held that the Home Secretary’s decision to order the appellant’s extradition to Missouri did not breach the applicant’s rights under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The court applied the ECHR test from Kafkaris v Cyprus: a whole‑life sentence is not necessarily incompatible with article 3 provided it is de jure and de facto reducible. It further held that the context of extradition allows consideration of the public interest in extradition (following Soering), so that a sentence that might be problematic domestically will not ipso facto bar extradition unless in the particular case it would be clearly or grossly disproportionate or otherwise reach the high threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment. The court concluded that Missouri’s statutory provision for executive clemency and the nature and alleged gravity of the offences meant that extradition was not incompatible with article 3.

The appellant, Ralston Wellington, was accused by the State of Missouri of two premeditated murders and an attempted murder committed in Kansas City on 13 February 1997. Arrested in London on 29 January 2003 on a provisional warrant, he was committed following a district judge hearing on 13 October 2003 and the Governor of Missouri submitted an extradition request. The Missouri prosecutor undertook not to seek the death penalty. The Home Secretary ordered extradition on 13 June 2006. The appellant challenged that decision by judicial review on the ground that extradition would breach his Convention right under article 3 by exposing him to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole (first degree murder under Revised Statutes of Missouri section 565.020). The Administrative Court dismissed the judicial review ([2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin)) and the appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

Nature of the claim: a challenge under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that ordering extradition would be incompatible with article 3 ECHR because the likely sentence in Missouri (life without parole) amounts to inhuman or degrading punishment.

Issues framed:

• whether a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole would, if imposed domestically, constitute inhuman or degrading punishment under article 3; and
• whether it matters for article 3 protection that such a sentence would be imposed by a foreign State following extradition rather than by a United Kingdom authority.

Reasoning: the House reviewed Strasbourg and domestic authorities, principally Kafkaris v Cyprus and Soering v United Kingdom, and domestic cases including R v Lichniak and R v Bieber. It accepted that an irreducible whole‑life sentence can raise an issue under article 3 but that the relevant test is whether the sentence is reducible de jure and de facto. Where review and a real operational possibility of release exist, article 3 is not engaged merely by the imposition of a whole‑life tariff. In extradition cases the court must also take into account the legitimate public interest in extradition; article 3 does not apply in an undiluted domestic fashion but in a manner that recognises extradition’s aims and the availability of trial in the requesting state. Applying those principles, the House found that Missouri’s clemency power and its practical use meant the sentence was not irreducible in the required sense, and that, on the particular facts and alleged gravity of the offences, a mandatory life sentence without parole would not be clearly or grossly disproportionate so as to meet the high threshold for an article 3 bar to extradition.

Disposition: the appeal was dismissed. The Lords observed that a complaint under article 3 might arise in future if a prisoner’s continued detention became inhuman or degrading, but that point is for determination if and when it arises.

Appeal dismissed. The House concluded that a whole life sentence without parole is not automatically incompatible with article 3; the correct test (from Kafkaris) is whether the sentence is reducible de jure and de facto. In extradition cases the court must also take account of the public interest in extradition (Soering). On the facts, Missouri’s clemency mechanism and the grave nature of the alleged offences meant extradition did not breach article 3.

Appeal from the Administrative Court (Laws LJ and Davis J), which dismissed the appellant's judicial review of the Home Secretary's decision ([2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin)). The appellant had earlier been committed to await decision following a district judge hearing on 13 October 2003.