Manchester City Council v Pinnock (Rev 1)

On a possession claim concerning a demoted tenancy, the county court’s statutory role is limited. It must determine whether the landlord has followed the notice and review procedure required by the Housing Act 1996. If the procedure has been followed, the court must make an order for possession. It cannot review the substance, rationality or Convention compatibility of the landlord’s decision.

The landlord’s decision may be challenged by judicial review in the Administrative Court. The applicable domestic public-law test is whether the decision was one that no reasonable person could consider justifiable. The court should exercise extreme caution before quashing a possession decision following an earlier demotion order.

Cleveland Pinnock had been a local-authority tenant for about 30 years. His tenancy was demoted after the county court found serious anti-social behaviour involving members of his family and considered demotion reasonable and proportionate.

Before the demotion period expired, Manchester City Council served notice of proceedings for possession, relying on further criminal and anti-social conduct by Mr Pinnock’s sons. A review panel upheld the decision. His Honour Judge Holman ordered possession, holding that he could review the decision on conventional judicial-review grounds but not directly determine Convention rights.

The appeal concerned the jurisdiction of the county court under the demoted-tenancy provisions, the relevance of Article 8, and the scope of any review of the landlord’s decision.

The appeal was dismissed. Lord Justice Stanley Burnton gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Lloyd and Lord Justice Mummery agreed.

1. County court jurisdiction. Section 143D of the Housing Act 1996 confined the county court to deciding whether the procedure under sections 143E and 143F had been followed. If it had, the court was required to make an order for possession. If it had not, the order could not be made. Section 143N did not enlarge that express restriction to permit review of the merits, rationality or Convention compatibility of the landlord’s decision.
2. Article 8 and the statutory scheme. The court considered that the demotion order was the first stage of a two-stage process. At that stage, an independent court had already considered reasonableness and proportionality. The authorities indicated that the landlord’s later decision would satisfy Article 8 if it was one that no reasonable person could consider unjustifiable. The court nevertheless held that this issue was not for the county court to determine on the possession claim.
3. Review procedure. The time limit in section 143F(6) was directory rather than mandatory. Non-compliance did not automatically invalidate a review, because Parliament had not made invalidity the consequence and a mandatory construction could produce unreasonable and repetitive proceedings. The approach in R v Soneji, McDonagh v Salisbury District Council and R (Chelfat) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets supported that conclusion.
4. Administrative review. The review panel’s decision was susceptible to judicial review in the Administrative Court. The applicable grounds were domestic public-law grounds, informed by the extended rationality approach described in Doherty v Birmingham City Council and discussed in Doran v Liverpool City Council and Central Bedfordshire Council v Taylor. The Administrative Court should be extremely cautious before quashing a possession decision after a demotion order.
5. Additional guidance. A possession notice need not necessarily allege a breach of an express tenancy term. The landlord’s reasons could include relevant matters concerning management of its housing estate. Events after the notice could also be considered if fairness permitted. On the facts, the sons’ conduct, the evidence concerning parental control and the later burglary were capable of supporting the panel’s decision. These conclusions were not necessary to the disposal of the appeal because the county court lacked jurisdiction to conduct that substantive review.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2009] EWCA Civ 852, the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the county court’s jurisdiction was limited to compliance with the statutory procedure.
• Manchester County Court: On 22 December 2008, His Honour Judge Holman ordered Mr Pinnock to give possession. He held that the review panel’s decision could be examined on conventional judicial-review grounds but upheld the decision.