Harpers Leisure International Ltd, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of Surrey & Anor

The claimant sought judicial review of steps taken in a Licensing Act 2003 review of its premises licence and, in particular, challenged the sub-committee's refusal to stay or strike out the review on grounds of abuse of process. The court held that the question whether a licensing sub-committee has power to stay or strike out such proceedings is one of statutory construction under the Licensing Act 2003. The court concluded that no general implied power to stay or strike out review proceedings for abuse of process could be implied into the Licensing Act beyond the specific powers Parliament provided (notably section 51(4) to reject grounds that are irrelevant, frivolous, vexatious or a repetition and the procedural scheme in sections 51 and 52).

The judge emphasised that the Act and its regulations create a partly inquisitorial, partly adversarial procedure, provide express mechanisms for rejecting grounds and for appeals, and that public law challenges to responsible authorities remain available by way of judicial review rather than by an implied procedural power in the licensing sub-committee. The claim was dismissed.

Background and parties:

• The claimant company and its managing director challenged actions taken in a licensing review instigated by the police. The defendants were the Chief Constable of Surrey and Guildford Borough Council (the licensing authority). The police brought a review under the Licensing Act 2003.

Nature of the claim and relief sought:

• The claim included a challenge to the police decision to instigate the review (permission to pursue that ground was refused earlier), and, within the permission granted by Burton J, a focused challenge to the licensing sub-committee's conclusion that it lacked power to stay or strike out review proceedings as an abuse of process. The claimants also complained of late disclosure of evidence and refusal to adjourn.

Procedural posture:

• On paper, permission to judicially review was refused by Lloyd Jones J as to the police decision to instigate the review. The claimants renewed the application and Burton J granted limited permission confined to whether the licensing sub-committee had power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process (permission limited to that issue).

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the licensing sub-committee had an implied power, derived from its statutory ability to regulate procedure (section 9(3) of the Licensing Act 2003 and the Hearings Regulations), to bring review proceedings to a final end by staying or striking out on abuse of process/public law grounds.
• Whether, even if such a power existed, it would be appropriate for a licensing sub-committee to exercise it on the basis of public law grounds rather than by way of judicial review.

Court's reasoning:

• The court treated the question as one of statutory construction: licensing authorities have no inherent jurisdiction beyond that conferred by statute. The scheme of the Licensing Act 2003 and associated regulations was examined in detail (including sections 4, 9, 51 and 52 and the Hearings Regulations). Parliament had made express provision for rejecting grounds for review in section 51(4) (irrelevance, frivolousness, vexatiousness, repetition) and provided time limits, adjournment powers and an appeal mechanism. Those express provisions were a strong indication that a wider implied power to stay or strike out for abuse of process should not be read into the Act.
• The court further noted that the review process is designed to permit an investigatory, partly informal discussion-led hearing, that appeals to the Magistrates' Court are by way of a complete rehearing and that judicial review remains available to challenge public law defects in the decision-making process of responsible authorities. Implying a power that would permit final termination of proceedings by a sub-committee on public law grounds would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and with the availability of judicial review.
• Accordingly, the sub-committee was correct that it lacked the wider power asserted by the claimants and the claim was dismissed. The court awarded costs to the second defendant in the sum claimed by its schedule.

The claim is dismissed. The court held that the licensing sub-committee did not possess a general implied power to stay or strike out review proceedings for abuse of process beyond the specific powers Parliament provided (notably section 51(4) of the Licensing Act 2003). The statutory scheme, including the Hearings Regulations and the appeal mechanism, indicates Parliament intended any final termination of grounds to be confined to the circumstances expressly set out in the Act, and public law challenges should ordinarily be pursued by judicial review rather than by an implied procedural power before a licensing sub-committee.

The judgment records interlocutory steps: permission to bring judicial review on the papers was initially refused by Lloyd Jones J; on renewal Burton J granted limited permission confined to whether the licensing sub-committee had power to stay proceedings for abuse of process. No neutral citations for those procedural rulings are provided in the judgment.