Harpers Leisure International Ltd, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of Surrey & Anor

A licensing authority has no inherent power to stay or strike out a premises-licence review for abuse of process. Any such power must arise expressly or by necessary implication from the Licensing Act 2003. The Act identifies the circumstances in which review grounds may be rejected, including irrelevance, frivolousness, vexatiousness and repetition. Its appeal provisions and procedural scheme weigh against implying a wider power. Public-law complaints about a responsible authority’s conduct remain matters for judicial review, rather than a collateral basis for terminating the licensing process.

The claimant challenged a police-initiated review of its premises licence under the Licensing Act 2003. Permission was granted only to challenge the licensing sub-committee’s conclusion that it lacked power to stay or strike out the review proceedings as an abuse of process. The alleged abuse concerned failures by the police to consult fairly and comply with published protocols, together with complaints about late evidence and uncertainty about the relief sought.

The central issue was whether the statutory scheme conferred, expressly or by implication, a power to bring the review proceedings to a final end before their merits were considered.

1. Claim dismissed. The sub-committee correctly concluded that it had no power to stay or strike out the review proceedings for abuse of process beyond the powers expressly provided by section 51 of the Licensing Act 2003.
2. The issue was one of statutory construction. The authority had no inherent jurisdiction. The statutory language, purpose and overall scheme had to be considered.
3. Section 51 expressly permits rejection of review grounds that are irrelevant to the licensing objectives and, for applications by persons other than responsible authorities, grounds that are frivolous, vexatious or repetitive. This indicated that Parliament had identified the circumstances in which review grounds could be rejected.
4. Section 52 required a hearing and specified the available outcomes. Section 52(11) expressly dealt with the effect of a determination pending appeal. The appeal to the Magistrates’ Court was a complete rehearing. These features weighed against implying a general power to terminate proceedings.
5. Responsible authorities’ decisions remained subject to public-law control. Parliament had not created a dual track under which licensing sub-committees would determine collateral judicial-review complaints and terminate the licensing process without considering the merits.
6. The court expressed a preliminary, unresolved view that even if a wider power existed, it would be doubtful whether a licensing sub-committee could use a public-law challenge concerning private rights as a collateral basis for ending proceedings. No conclusion was reached on that issue or on the Magistrates’ Court’s powers on appeal.
7. Costs were ordered against the claimant in the sum set out in the second defendant’s schedule.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. Permission was initially refused by Lloyd Jones J and later granted by Burton J on a limited basis.