Commission for Equality & Human Rights v Griffin & Ors

An injunction backed by a penal notice must be expressed with sufficient clarity for those bound by it to understand what conduct is prohibited. Any genuine ambiguity should be resolved in the less onerous manner. An order directed to discriminatory terms of admission to an unincorporated association does not ordinarily extend to conditions governing the exercise of rights by existing members, such as attending meetings, voting or holding office. A prohibition concerning a particular clause must be read in its procedural and litigation context and does not necessarily prohibit similar provisions used for a different status or purpose.

The Commission sought the committal of three defendants, sued as representatives of the British National Party, for alleged breaches of an injunction made by His Honour Judge Collins in the Central London County Court on 12 March 2010. The injunction prohibited discriminatory conditions of membership, required removal of specified constitutional provisions and required related notification steps.

The BNP subsequently adopted version 12.2 of its constitution. The Commission contended that discriminatory conditions formerly imposed on admission had been reintroduced as conditions for attending meetings, voting and obtaining voting-member status. The defendants disputed the scope of the order. The Administrative Court determined, as preliminary issues, the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order and whether version 12.2 materially failed to comply with it.

1. The court held that an injunction supported by a penal notice must be construed so that those to whom it is addressed can understand clearly what they are required to do or refrain from doing. Where the order admits of two reasonable meanings, the less onerous construction must be adopted. The court applied the approach in Redwing Ltd v Redwing Forest Products Ltd (1947) 64 R.P.C. 67.

2. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Judge Collins’s order, read in the context of the proceedings, judgment and the order as a whole, were directed principally to the terms on which persons were admitted to BNP membership. They did not extend to conditions governing the exercise by existing members of rights such as attending official meetings, voting or holding office.

3. The court left open whether the order might also extend to terms governing retention of membership. That issue did not arise because the relevant provisions had been amended and no complaint was made about them. The court expressed no opinion on whether restrictions on existing members’ rights were independently actionable under the legislation then in force.

4. The prohibition concerning clause 4.38 had to be read with the order requiring its removal. It prohibited applying that clause as such pending its removal from the constitution. The order was not sufficiently clear to prohibit a similar interview requirement imposed as a condition of obtaining the separate status of voting member under another section of the constitution.

5. The court therefore confined its decision to the meaning of the order and compliance with version 12.2. The matter was to be listed for directions concerning its future course.

The judgment describes proceedings in the Central London County Court before His Honour Judge Collins C.B.E.

• Central London County Court: on 12 March 2010, Judge Collins made the injunction concerning discriminatory BNP membership provisions.
• High Court (Administrative Court): the County Court proceedings were transferred to the High Court after concerns about jurisdiction to make a sequestration order. The High Court determined the preliminary questions concerning interpretation of the injunction and version 12.2.