Manchester City Council v Pinnock

A court asked by a local or other public authority to order possession of a person’s home must be able, if the occupier raises the point, to decide whether eviction is proportionate under article 8 and to resolve relevant factual disputes. The defence should first be screened summarily and pursued only if it could affect the order.

Exceptionality is an outcome, not a legal test. Domestic entitlement to possession and the authority’s housing-management duties carry substantial weight. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, section 143D(2) of the Housing Act 1996 must be read as permitting the County Court to determine and give effect to an article 8 defence. Depending on proportionality, the court may postpone, suspend or refuse possession.

Manchester City Council v Pinnock concerned a local authority tenant whose secure tenancy had been demoted after extensive anti-social and criminal conduct by members of his household. Further incidents involving his sons led the Council to serve notice seeking possession. Its review panel upheld that decision.

The Manchester County Court made an outright possession order. It considered that its role was confined to conventional judicial review and that it could neither resolve disputed facts nor determine proportionality under article 8. The Court of Appeal dismissed the tenant’s appeal in [2009] EWCA Civ 852, holding that section 143D(2) of the Housing Act 1996 limited the County Court to determining whether the statutory procedure had been followed.

The Supreme Court considered whether article 8 required an independent judicial determination of proportionality, whether the statutory demoted-tenancy regime could be read compatibly with that requirement, and whether the possession order was proportionate on the facts.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously and the possession order upheld. Although the courts below had applied the wrong legal approach, the Supreme Court itself considered proportionality and concluded that eviction was proportionate.

2. Where a local authority seeks possession of a person’s home, the court must be able to determine whether eviction is proportionate under article 8 and to decide relevant factual disputes. The Court followed the clear and consistent Strasbourg jurisprudence and adopted the minority approach in Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43 and Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10. The contrary majority approach in those decisions and its substantial reaffirmation in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57 were not followed.

3. Exceptionality is an outcome, not a useful guide to proportionality. The question is whether eviction is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. A local authority’s domestic entitlement to possession, its ownership rights and its duties concerning allocation and management of housing stock ordinarily provide powerful justification. Particular or unusual reasons relied upon by the authority must be pleaded and proved.

4. An article 8 defence ordinarily arises only where the premises are the occupier’s home and the occupier raises the issue. The court should initially assess the defence summarily. It should investigate further only where the alleged facts could affect the order. Article 8 may justify extra time, suspension on appropriate terms or, exceptionally, refusal of possession.

5. Section 143D(2) of the Housing Act 1996, read under sections 3 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, permits the County Court to exercise all powers needed to determine and give effect to an article 8 defence. Lawful compliance with sections 143E and 143F includes observance of natural justice and Convention rights. Public law objections to commencing or continuing possession proceedings may be raised in the possession claim itself. The contrary reasoning in Manchester City Council v Cochrane [1999] 1 WLR 809 was disapproved.

6. Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 did not override article 8. It required due regard to crime prevention while preserving other obligations. Section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not apply because the Council was neither compelled to seek possession nor unable to exercise its powers compatibly with article 8. The demoted-tenancy regime was therefore compatible with article 8.

7. The Council and the court could consider relevant grounds not amounting to breaches of the tenancy, information arising after the notice, and grounds omitted from the notice. An erroneous reason did not invalidate the claim unless it affected matters such as the landlord’s good faith. Given the persistent history of crime and nuisance, the recent demotion, the neighbours’ interests and the Council’s housing-management duties, the possession order was proportionate. The remaining factual disputes could not alter that conclusion, so remittal was unnecessary.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: The appeal was dismissed unanimously in [2010] UKSC 45. The possession order was upheld after the Court itself determined that eviction was proportionate.
2. Court of Appeal: The tenant’s appeal was dismissed in [2009] EWCA Civ 852. The court held that section 143D(2) of the Housing Act 1996 confined the County Court to examining whether the prescribed procedure had been followed.
3. Manchester County Court: On 22 December 2008 Judge Holman made an outright possession order. He treated his jurisdiction as limited to conventional judicial review, but held that the Council’s decision was rational.
4. Manchester County Court: On 8 June 2007 Recorder Scott Donovan declined to order possession but made a demotion order after finding serious anti-social conduct by members of the tenant’s household.