Simpson v Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust

The Court of Appeal held that a cause of action in tort for personal injury is, in principle, a legal "chose in action" and capable of assignment under section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925. However, an assignment of a bare cause of action will be void if it offends public policy by amounting to maintenance or champerty. The court concluded that the assignment in this case savoured of champerty because the assignee (Mrs Simpson) had no legally recognised interest in the plaintiff's claim and wished to pursue the litigation for collateral purposes rather than to obtain compensation for the original claimant. For those reasons the appeal was dismissed.

Background and parties:

• Mr Alan Catchpole brought proceedings in the Bury St Edmunds County Court for damages for personal injury against the Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust alleging negligent infection control leading to MRSA infection.
• Mrs Jennifer Simpson, who had separate grievances against the same hospital, entered into a deed of assignment under which Mr Catchpole purported to assign his claim to her for the sum of £1. She then pursued the claim in her own name and increased the quantum claimed.

Procedural history:

• The hospital applied to strike out the claim; District Judge Kirby struck it out. The decision was unsuccessfully appealed to His Honour Judge Moloney Q.C. at Cambridge County Court. The matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal on the limited issues of assignability and public policy.

Issues framed by the court:

1. Whether a cause of action in tort for personal injury is capable of assignment as a legal thing in action.
2. If such a cause of action is assignable in principle, whether the particular assignment is void as contrary to public policy because it savours of maintenance or champerty or because the assignee lacks a sufficient legitimate interest.

Court's reasoning and disposition:

• The court concluded that causes of action for personal injury are, in principle, choses in action and can be assigned. The identity of the claimant was not an essential aspect of the defendant's obligation to pay compensation which arises by operation of law.
• Nonetheless, longstanding public policy limits remain: an assignment that effectively transfers a bare right to litigate to a person who has no legitimate interest in the subject matter will be void as amounting to champerty or unlawful maintenance. The authorities, notably Trendtex, continue to prohibit assignments made to enable third parties to profit from litigation where no recognised interest justifies the intervention.
• Applying those principles, the court held that Mrs Simpson had no legally recognised interest sufficient to support the assignment; her primary interest was to pursue a campaign against the hospital rather than to secure compensation for Mr Catchpole. The assignment therefore savoured of champerty and was void. The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. The court held that tort claims for personal injury are in principle assignable as choses in action under section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925, but an assignment of a bare cause of action will be void where it offends public policy by amounting to maintenance or champerty. In the present case the assignee had no legally recognised interest sufficient to validate the assignment, which therefore savoured of champerty and was void.

Proceedings began in the Bury St Edmunds County Court (initial claim by Mr Catchpole). The defendant applied to strike out; District Judge Kirby allowed the application. The decision was appealed to Cambridge County Court (His Honour Judge Moloney Q.C.) where the appeal was dismissed. The matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal, reported as [2011] EWCA Civ 1149.