Hayes v Willoughby

The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal and granted an injunction. The central legal issue was the correct construction of section 1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which excludes from the prohibition a course of conduct pursued "for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime". The court held that s.1(3)(a) is confined to a course of conduct the purpose of which is preventing or detecting crime (i.e. that purpose must be the purpose of the course of conduct, not merely one of several purposes). If the course of conduct has more than one purpose and preventing or detecting crime is not the sole purpose, the defendant cannot rely on s.1(3)(a) and must instead rely on s.1(3)(c) to show the conduct was reasonable.

The judge at first instance erred in construing s.1(3)(a) as available where a defendant genuinely believed or suspected criminality even if the conduct was unreasonable and obsessive. The Court of Appeal concluded that, on the facts found by the trial judge, the respondent had not shown that the purpose of his lengthy campaign was preventing or detecting crime once authorities had investigated and declined to act; the irrational persistence demonstrated another purpose. The three discrete incidents found to be unrelated to preventing or detecting crime formed part of the same campaign and reinforced that the conduct as a whole was not protected by s.1(3)(a) or s.1(3)(c).

Background and parties: The respondent, Mr Willoughby, over a seven year period (2002–2009) pursued an intensive campaign of correspondence and investigation against the claimant, Mr Hayes, making repeated allegations of fraud and related offences to various public authorities. The Official Receiver and police investigated and did not substantiate the allegations. The claimant sued for harassment and sought injunctive relief.

Procedural posture: The trial judge, His Honour Judge Moloney QC (Cambridge County Court), found that the respondent's conduct was lengthy, persistent and excessive and amounted to harassment but concluded that s.1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 applied because the respondent genuinely believed criminality had occurred. The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: A civil claim for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and an injunction prohibiting further contact and investigation by the respondent.

Issues framed:

• How to construe s.1(3)(a): whether the exclusion applies where preventing or detecting crime was one purpose among others, or whether it requires that the purpose of the course of conduct was preventing or detecting crime.
• Whether three particular incidents, which the trial judge found were not for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, formed part of the same course of conduct and therefore undermined any s.1(3)(a) defence.

Court's reasoning and conclusions: The Court of Appeal held that s.1(3)(a) is confined to a course of conduct the purpose of which was preventing or detecting crime; it is not sufficient that preventing or detecting crime was merely one of several purposes. The statutory scheme and protective purpose of the Act required a straightforward test capable of application in civil and criminal contexts. Section 1(3)(c) remains available to a defendant who cannot show the exclusive purpose but can show the course of conduct was reasonable. Applying the statutory test to the trial judge's factual findings, the appellant had demonstrated that the respondent's persistence became irrational and obsessive after authorities had investigated and refused to act; therefore the respondent could not show the purpose of the course of conduct was preventing or detecting crime. The three incidents that were unrelated to preventing or detecting crime formed part of the campaign and reinforced that the whole course of conduct was not protected by s.1(3)(a) and would have to be judged under s.1(3)(c), which was not established. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted an injunction in specified terms.

Wider context: The court emphasised that s.1(3)(a) is not intended to permit vigilante behaviour and that the defence will rarely succeed outside law enforcement contexts.

Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal held that s.1(3)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is confined to a course of conduct the purpose of which was preventing or detecting crime; a course of conduct with multiple purposes cannot rely on s.1(3)(a) unless preventing or detecting crime was the purpose of the course. On the trial judge's factual findings the respondent could not show that the purpose of his campaign was preventing or detecting crime once authorities had declined to act, and the three incidents not pursued for that purpose formed part of the campaign and reinforced that conclusion. The court therefore granted an injunction.

Appeal from Cambridge County Court, His Honour Judge Moloney QC (case no. 9CB01831). No further appellate steps stated in the judgment.