Secretary of State for Justice v Slee

Eligibility for compensation under the Justices of the Peace Act 1949 (Compensation) Regulations 1978 depends on the substance of the work, not an employee’s title. The duties of a justices’ clerk have a central judicial character but may include administrative work connected with running the court. A tribunal must assess the range and nature of the office’s duties and the assistance actually provided.

For long-term compensation, suitable employment under regulation 12(1)(c) is not confined by the deeming provision in regulation 7(2). It has a contextual meaning, requiring consideration of the claimant’s circumstances and the interrelated statutory factors. An appellate court may uphold a decision despite a legal error where the material findings cover the correct ground and there is no real prospect of a different result.

The Secretary of State appealed against Silber J’s dismissal of an appeal from an Employment Tribunal. The Tribunal had allowed Debra Slee’s claim for consideration of long-term compensation after her post in the magistrates’ courts was removed during reorganisation.

The appeal concerned whether she was employed in assisting a justices’ clerk within regulation 3(1)(b) at the relevant dates, and whether she had sought suitable employment for the purposes of regulation 12(1)(c). The Administrative Court decision was reported at [2010] EWHC 73 (Admin).

1. Appeal dismissed. The respondent fell within regulation 3(1)(b). The question was whether her work assisted the holder of the office of justices’ clerk in performing the duties of that office at the relevant dates.
2. The duties of a justices’ clerk have a central judicial or quasi-judicial character, but they are not confined to judicial functions. Administrative work connected with the running of the court may fall within the office. The statutory schemes did not provide a precise or inflexible definition. The range and nature of the duties, and the assistance actually given, had to be assessed on the facts.
3. The respondent’s titles, including Deputy Justices’ Chief Executive, were not conclusive. The Secretary of State had not shown that the work performed after 2001 involved strategic or other functions outside the office of justices’ clerk. Bowden v Northamptonshire Magistrates Courts Committee & Anr (The Times, 16 February 1993) concerned a materially different appointment. The court treated Berkshire & Oxfordshire Magistrates Court Committee v Gannon & Anr ([2000] ICR 1003) as illustrating the difficulty of drawing a rigid dividing line.
4. Suitable employment in regulation 12(1)(c) was not controlled by regulation 7(2). The expression had its natural meaning in the context of the compensation scheme. The claimant’s personal circumstances, the conditions and benefits of the former and alternative employment, the efforts made to obtain suitable work, and the other relevant circumstances were interrelated considerations. The statutory assessment was distinct from the common-law duty to mitigate, although Arden LJ explained that regulation 12(1)(c) operated as a statutory form of mitigation by preventing artificially low earnings from increasing compensation.
5. The Tribunal had made detailed findings covering the relevant matters. Although it had adopted an erroneous interpretation of suitable employment, those findings remained relevant under the correct test. There was no real possibility of a different conclusion, and strong reasons existed against remitting the matter for a third hearing.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal: [2011] EWCA Civ 23.
2. Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal from the Employment Tribunal: [2010] EWHC 73 (Admin).
3. Employment Tribunal allowed the respondent’s appeal against refusal of long-term compensation under the Regulations.