Beedles v Guinness Northern Counties Ltd

For purposes of section 24C of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, a disabled tenant’s ‘enjoyment’ of let premises means ordinary lawful use and the full benefit of the tenancy, rather than securing pleasure or general happiness. The question is whether, without the requested auxiliary aid or service, it would be impossible or unreasonably difficult for the tenant to enjoy the premises. A landlord’s waiver of a tenant’s decorating obligation did not make redecoration by the landlord necessary where the tenant could continue to occupy the home. Cost is relevant to whether requested steps are reasonable, but that question is reached only if the statutory threshold is met.

Mr Beedles, a disabled tenant of Guinness Northern Counties Ltd, appealed against a decision of Langstaff J dated 27 May 2010. His assured tenancy placed responsibility for internal decoration on him, but his epilepsy made ladder work hazardous. The landlord waived its right to enforce the decorating obligation but denied that it was required to redecorate.

The appeal initially concerned whether ‘enjoyment’ of premises under section 24C of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 meant deriving pleasure from the tenancy or merely exercising the rights granted by the lease. The appellant advanced a narrower argument before the Court of Appeal, namely that he should be able to live as a typical tenant. The central issues were the meaning of ‘enjoyment’ and whether the state of decoration made enjoyment impossible or unreasonably difficult.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Moses LJ gave the principal judgment. Carnwath LJ agreed, while reserving his position on whether the statute could transfer a positive contractual obligation to repair from tenant to landlord. Maurice Kay LJ also agreed.
2. The words ‘enjoy’ and ‘enjoyment’ in section 24C of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 refer to exercising and using the tenant’s right and obtaining its full benefit. They concern the ability to use the premises in an ordinary lawful way, not a right to derive pleasure or to general happiness. The interpretation was consistent with the reasoning in Southwark London Borough Council v Tanner & Others [2001] 1 AC and Kenny v Preen [1963] 1 QB 499.
3. The statutory threshold in section 24C(3)(b) is whether, without the requested auxiliary aid or service, it would be impossible or unreasonably difficult for the disabled tenant to enjoy the premises in that sense. The assessment is objective and fact-sensitive. On the findings below, the peeling wallpaper, discolouration, damp and mould did not prevent occupation or make enjoyment unreasonably difficult. The landlord’s waiver of the tenant’s decorating obligation therefore did not require it to undertake redecoration.
4. The disability provisions should be construed purposively and benevolently towards their intended beneficiaries. Reasonable-adjustment duties may entail more favourable treatment to address special difficulties. However, the appeal failed on the factual threshold before the question of the reasonableness of particular steps under section 24C(2) arose. Cost would have been relevant to that question.
5. No argument was advanced under section 24D. The court nevertheless indicated, without deciding the issue, that if the landlord had insisted on the contractual decorating term, the tenant might have argued that reasonable steps were required to change or cease relying on it because compliance would put his safety at risk.
6. The Part 3 Code could illustrate the practical scope of the provision, but its examples could not determine the meaning of the statute. Relevant provisions of the Code had to be taken into account under section 51(5).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed. Moses LJ, Carnwath LJ and Maurice Kay LJ agreed that the factual findings defeated the appeal.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division — Langstaff J, in a judgment dated 27 May 2010, rejected the tenant’s interpretation of section 24C and held that the Act conferred no greater right than the tenancy terms.