Beedles v Guinness Northern Counties Ltd

The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the words "enjoy" and "enjoyment" in section 24C of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 as applied to let premises and auxiliary aids or services. The court held that those words denote the ability to exercise and have the full benefit of the rights conferred by the tenancy (an ability to use the premises in an ordinary lawful way) rather than a right to derive personal pleasure from occupation. The court accepted that the statutory duty in s.24C requires reasonable steps to provide auxiliary aids or services where, in all the circumstances, doing so would enable a disabled tenant to enjoy the premises in that sense and it is not unreasonable to require them. However, on the facts as found by the judge (minor peeling wallpaper, patches of discolouration and some mould) it was not established that absence of landlord redecoration made it impossible or unreasonably difficult for the appellant to enjoy the premises. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

This is an appeal from Langstaff J's decision in the High Court (Manchester District Registry) dated 27 May 2010. The appellant, an assured tenant who suffers from epilepsy, sought to rely on sections 24A, 24C and related provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 to compel his landlord to carry out internal decorating and repair work which the tenancy contract required the tenant to perform. The tenant argued that because his epilepsy made it unsafe for him to decorate (risk of falling from a ladder during a seizure) the landlord was under a duty to provide an auxiliary aid or service to enable him to "enjoy" the premises.

The court recorded the statutory scheme (sections 24A, 24C, 24D and 24E and related regulatory power) and noted that regulations identify some examples of auxiliary aids or services. The key legal issue was the meaning of the words "enjoy" and "enjoyment" in s.24C and whether they imported a right to derive pleasure from occupation or rather the ability to use the premises in the ordinary, lawful way intended by the letting (akin to the traditional covenant of quiet enjoyment).

The Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened. The Court of Appeal endorsed a purposive, benevolent construction of the disability provisions (citing authorities on reasonable adjustments and positive treatment) but concluded that "enjoy" should be read as referring to the exercise and use of the right to occupy and to have the full benefit of the tenancy, not a general right to happiness. The court also noted s.24E(1) (it is never reasonable to require removal or alteration of a physical feature) and observed that s.24D could, in different circumstances, require the landlord to change tenancy terms that made enjoyment unreasonably difficult, though s.24D was not argued here.

Applying the statutory test to the facts, the court accepted the judge's findings of minor decorative defects and his conclusion that the defects did not render occupation impossible or unreasonably difficult. As a result the appellant did not establish that the landlord had failed to comply with a duty under s.24C. The appeal failed on factual and legal grounds.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that in the context of ss.24A–24E of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 the words "enjoy" and "enjoyment" relate to the exercise and full benefit of the rights of occupation (the ability to use the premises in an ordinary lawful way) rather than to deriving pleasure. Although the statute should be construed benevolently to afford reasonable adjustments to disabled persons, the judge's factual findings showed the state of decoration did not make it impossible or unreasonably difficult for the appellant to enjoy the premises; accordingly no duty under s.24C was established on these facts.

Appeal from the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Manchester District Registry (Langstaff J, judgment dated 27 May 2010) to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division ([2011] EWCA Civ 442). The Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened in the Court of Appeal proceedings.