Greenwich Community Law Centre, R (on the application of) v Greenwich London Borough Council

The public sector equality duty requires substantive consideration of equality implications. It is not a tick-box exercise, although courts must avoid micro-managing public administration. A public authority need consider only protected characteristics, or combinations of characteristics, likely to be engaged. Where a realistic possibility exists, further investigation may be required before a characteristic is treated as irrelevant. A formal equality impact assessment is not required before every decision. The continuing duty does not require fresh, detailed assessment for every minor implementation change, provided the policy framework addresses the relevant considerations. The Council’s priority groups covered the realistically affected protected groups, while accessibility was considered in the tender specification and subsequent review. The Council therefore complied with section 149 of the Equalities Act 2010.

Greenwich Community Law Centre challenged Greenwich London Borough Council’s decision to award an employment and immigration advice contract to another provider following a reduction in voluntary-sector funding and a move to modular commissioning. It argued that the change in policy required a fresh equality impact assessment and that the Cabinet lacked sufficient material to discharge its public sector equality duty.

Mr Justice Cranston dismissed the judicial review application. The appeal was limited to compliance with section 149 of the Equalities Act 2010, including the significance of the change in commissioning arrangements, the adequacy of the equality material before the Cabinet, and accessibility for protected groups.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Elias delivered the leading judgment. Lady Justice Black and Lord Justice Ward agreed.
2. Compliance with the public sector equality duty is a question of substance. The court must ask whether the decision-maker had due regard to the relevant statutory needs. The duty is not discharged by a formal or tick-box approach, but the court must avoid micro-managing the administrative exercise.
3. Only protected characteristics, or combinations of characteristics, likely to arise in the exercise of the public function need be considered. If there is a realistic possibility that a characteristic may be engaged, further investigation may be required before it is treated as irrelevant. It is often merely a matter of semantics whether the duty is described as unengaged or engaged but irrelevant or insignificant. These principles were applied with reference to R (Bailey) v Brent London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1586 and R (Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2012] EWHC 201 Admin.
4. A formal equality impact assessment is not required before every decision. The duty must be integrated into the authority’s functions and fulfilled before and at the time a relevant policy is considered. Its continuing nature does not require detailed reconsideration whenever the general framework is implemented or minor details are changed. The court relied on the principles discussed in R (Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141, R (Brown) v Work and Pensions Secretary [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin) and Pieretti v Enfield LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 1104.
5. The change from funding each consortium member to using one provider for each advice module was not a significant policy change. It was a different means of achieving the same objectives and was intended to reduce duplication and costs. The Council’s priority groups covered the protected groups realistically affected by the decision. Accessibility, geographical coverage and coordination between providers were addressed through the tender specification and considered again by the Cabinet after the call-in. The September reminder to have regard to equality obligations was insufficient by itself, but was adequate in context because the earlier equality impact assessment and subsequent modifications supplied the necessary framework.
6. The fact that final service locations had not yet been fixed did not establish a breach. A claimant alleging breach should at least identify a protected characteristic that might realistically have been engaged by the policy change but was not considered. The appeal was dismissed, and it was unnecessary to decide whether substantive relief would in any event have been appropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 24 April 2012, the court dismissed the appeal: [2012] EWCA Civ 496.
• High Court of Justice (Administrative Court) — Mr Justice Cranston dismissed the application for judicial review. No separate citation is stated in the judgment.