Egonu v Nash & Co Solicitors

The Race Relations Act 1976 does not regulate allegations made in family or matrimonial litigation merely because they concern a person’s race. Its employment-related, analogous, supply and sales contexts do not extend to that situation. A claim is also barred where proceedings are issued outside the Act’s six-month period: later discovery of the alleged statement does not create a latent-damage exception absent statutory wording. In wrongful interference with goods, bad faith or wrongful intent is not essential, but the claimant must plead and prove an exercise of dominion or dealing inconsistent with ownership. Placing goods with solicitors for collection, while acknowledging the claimant’s ownership, falls outside the tort.

Mr Egonu and a connected company brought proceedings in the Plymouth County Court against solicitors who had acted for Mr Egonu’s former wife. The claim alleged racial discrimination arising from a statement in an affidavit used in family proceedings and wrongful interference with goods left at the former matrimonial home. District Judge Troman struck out the claim on 26 May 2011. His Honour Judge Neligan dismissed the appeal on 18 August 2011. Mr Egonu then sought permission to pursue a second-stage appeal. The central issues were whether the discrimination claim fell within the Race Relations Act 1976, whether it was brought in time, and whether the solicitors’ handling of the goods could constitute wrongful interference.

1. Disposition. The application for permission to pursue a second-stage appeal was refused. A second-stage appeal ordinarily requires an important point of principle or another compelling reason. Neither claim disclosed a realistic argument warranting permission.
2. Racial discrimination. The alleged conduct concerned a statement in an affidavit used in matrimonial proceedings. The court held that the wide provisions in Part 1, including Sections 1 and 2, did not apply. Nor did the circumstances fall within Part 2. The Race Relations Act 1976 addressed employment and analogous situations, and the supply or sale of goods and services, but did not embrace this kind of litigation-related allegation.
3. The claim was independently out of time. The relevant event was the making of the statement in the affidavit as filed with the court. The Act’s strict six-month period was not extended by the claimant’s later discovery of the affidavit. The Act contained no equivalent of provisions dealing with latent damage or delayed knowledge.
4. Wrongful interference with goods. The absence of wrongful intent or bad faith was not an essential element. However, the claimant had to plead and prove an exercise of dominion, or dealing with the goods inconsistently with ownership. The court applied the principle stated in Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec Developments Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1253. The solicitors had held the goods at their offices to facilitate collection and had thereby acknowledged the claimant’s ownership. They had neither dealt with the goods inconsistently with ownership nor withheld them. The alleged conduct therefore fell outside the tort.
5. Lord Justice Davis added, as an obiter observation, that the claim would not even have satisfied the test for a first appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to pursue a second-stage appeal refused: [2012] EWCA Civ 673.
• Plymouth County Court: His Honour Judge Neligan dismissed the appeal on 18 August 2011.
• Plymouth County Court: District Judge Troman struck out the claim on 26 May 2011.