HM Revenue and Customs v The Football League Ltd & Anor
[2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch)
Case details
Case summary
The court considered whether provisions in The Football League's articles of association, regulations and Insolvency Policy (notably articles 4.7.4, 77 and 80 and related regulatory provisions) which give priority to so-called "football creditors" are void as contrary to fundamental insolvency principles. Two central legal principles were analysed: the anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu principle. The anti-deprivation rule prevents contractual provisions that remove assets from the insolvent estate on insolvency, while the pari passu principle requires pro rata distribution among unsecured creditors.
The judge held that the anti-deprivation rule applies from the commencement of an administration as it does on liquidation, whereas the pari passu principle becomes engaged only when an administrator gives notice of an intended distribution (or on liquidation). Applying the legal tests, the court concluded that, in the normal circumstances of Football League club administrations (which typically commence during the season and where the League operates article 80 during the season), the challenged provisions do not deprive clubs of an asset at the relevant time and therefore do not offend the anti-deprivation rule or pari passu principle. The court declined to make the declarations sought by HMRC.
Case abstract
Background and parties: HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) challenged the Football League's (FL) contractual regime for dealing with insolvent member clubs. The FL operates a "football creditor rule" under its articles, regulations and Insolvency Policy which, in practice, results in certain classes of football-related creditors (other clubs, players, the League itself, and related bodies) being paid in full in priority to other unsecured creditors in many insolvencies of member clubs.
Nature of the application: HMRC sought declarations that specified provisions of the FL's articles and Insolvency Policy (including article 4.7.4, parts of article 77 and article 80 and specified policy sections) are void and unenforceable because they conflict with the anti-deprivation rule and/or the pari passu principle in insolvency law.
Issues framed:
- Whether the anti-deprivation rule and the pari passu principle apply to companies in administration, and if so from what point in the administration;
- Whether the FL’s provisions operate to deprive an insolvent club of assets or to distribute assets on a non-pari passu basis at the relevant time;
- Whether the FL’s arrangements can be justified as bona fide commercial/regulatory measures that fall outside the anti-deprivation rule.
Court's reasoning and findings: The court analysed authorities on the anti-deprivation rule and pari passu principle (including Belmont Park and British Eagle). It held that the anti-deprivation rule applies from the commencement of an administration; the pari passu principle only bites when an administrator gives notice of an intended distribution (or on liquidation). The FL’s structure was examined: participation rights, player registrations and entitlement to payments from the Pool Account are governed by the articles. Article 77 conditions a club’s legal entitlement to payments on completing all fixture obligations for the relevant season; article 80 permits application of Pool Account sums to football creditors where a club defaults in paying them. The court concluded that, typically, administration commences during the season and the FL applies article 80 during the season so that no debt in the club’s favour crystallises beyond the balance remaining after football creditor payments. On that basis there was no deprivation of an asset at the relevant time and no non-pari passu distribution to be set aside. The court declined to decide a number of subsidiary contentious issues (for example the wider validity of "direct payment" clauses in construction contracts) as unnecessary to the decision.
Practical point: the judgment is narrowly focused on the legal tests and on typical factual patterns; the court recognised that different factual circumstances (for example insolvency commencing after the end of a season and before article 80 has operated) might give rise to a different result and should be decided in an appropriate factual case.
Held
Cited cases
- Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc, [2012] EWCA Civ 419 neutral
- Whitmore v Mason, (1861) 2 J&H 204 unclear
- The Official Assignee of Bombay v Shroff, (1932) 48 TLR 443 positive
- British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Cie Nationale Air France, [1975] 1 WLR 758 positive
- Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd, [1976] AC 167 neutral
- Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd, [1985] Ch 207 positive
- Wellworth Cash & Carry (North Shields) Ltd v Northeastern Electricity Board, [1986] BCC 99 positive
- Brady v Brady, [1989] AC 755 neutral
- Attorney-General v McMillan & Lockwood Ltd, [1991] 1 NZLR 53 neutral
- Re PT Garuda, [2001] EWCA Civ 1696 positive
- Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd, [2002] 1 WLR 1150 positive
- International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd, [2008] HCA 3 neutral
- Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (Butters v BBC part), [2010] Ch 347 positive
- Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc, [2011] 2 BCLC 120 neutral
- Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, [2012] 1 AC 383 positive
- Ex parte Newitt, 16 Ch D 522 mixed
Legislation cited
- Companies Act 2006: Part 26
- Insolvency Act 1984: paragraph 74 of Schedule B1
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 107 – s.107
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 238-245 – sections 238-245
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 306
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 339-344 – sections 339-344
- Insolvency Rules 1986: Rule 2.69
- Insolvency Rules 1986: Rule 2.85
- Insolvency Rules 1986: Rule 2.95
- Insolvency Rules 1986: Rule 4.181
- Law of Property Act 1925: Section 109(2)