Buck, R (On the Application Of) v Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council

The claimant sought a declaration that the directly-elected Mayor and Cabinet unlawfully refused to implement a budget amendment passed by the full Council on 5 March 2012 which allocated additional revenue to preserve pre-existing library services. The key legal issues were the allocation of decision-making powers between the executive (the Mayor and Cabinet) and the full Council under the Local Government Act 2000 scheme, the effect of the full Council's budgetary function under section 31A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, and the operation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of schedule 4 to the Local Authorities (Functions and Responsibilities) (England) Regulations 2000.

The court held that (i) the Mayor’s November 2011 decision to restructure library services was a valid executive decision made under the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964 and properly implemented; (ii) the full Council’s power in approving the budget is to allocate resources and make the requisite council tax calculations, but not to direct the executive how to exercise its substantive executive functions; and (iii) the budget amendment in this case created a contingency allocation available to the Mayor rather than a binding direction requiring expenditure in a specific manner. Accordingly the Mayor’s decision not to spend the allocated sum immediately was within executive competence and not caught by paragraphs 2 or 3 of schedule 4 of the 2000 Regulations. The claim was dismissed.

Background and parties. The claimant, a frequent user of Scawthorpe Library, challenged the Mayor and Cabinet of Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council after a majority of the full Council approved a budget amendment allocating funds intended to preserve or restore library services removed by the Mayor's earlier executive decision. The Mayor had previously restructured library provision following consultations and savings exercises, implementing closures and replacement of staff with volunteers or self-service arrangements.

(i) Nature of the claim / relief sought. The claimant sought a declaration that the Mayor and Cabinet acted unlawfully by refusing to implement the full Council’s 5 March 2012 budget amendment (which allocated approximately 382,250 for 2012-13) so as to require reopening of two closed libraries and restoring staff levels.

(ii) Issues framed by the court. The court identified as central: (a) whether the full Council, by approving the budget amendment, could require the executive to expend allocated sums in a particular way so as to displace a prior lawful executive decision; (b) whether the amendment was part of the authority’s budgetary calculations under section 31A(2)(a) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 such that the Mayor was bound; (c) whether the amendment could be treated as a plan or strategy reserved to the full Council so that paragraph 3 of schedule 4 to the 2000 Regulations precluded the executive acting contrary to it; and (d) whether the Mayor’s refusal was an improper exercise of power.

(iii) Reasoning and outcome. The court analysed the statutory scheme established by the Local Government Act 2000 and the 2000 Regulations, emphasising that executive functions are the default and that the budgetary role of full Council is to make the requisite calculations and to allocate resources for council tax purposes. The court concluded that section 31A obliges the full Council to calculate figures for council tax purposes but does not confer power to micro-manage or to direct the executive's mode of delivering services. The 5 March amendment was construed as creating a contingency allocation available to the executive, not as a binding instruction to spend in a particular way or to overturn a lawfully-made executive decision. The amendment was not a high-level plan or strategy reserved to the full Council. The court further held that the Padfield principle did not assist the claimant because the Mayor was exercising executive discretion properly conferred on him. The application was dismissed and the Mayor and Cabinet’s conduct held lawful.

The judgment notes the claimant's personal hardship from reduced library services but concluded that relief cannot be granted absent unlawfulness in the executive's decision-making process.

The application is dismissed. The court held that the Mayor and Cabinet lawfully exercised executive functions. The full Council’s budgetary power under section 31A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 permits allocation of resources but does not enable the full Council to direct the executive to expend allocated sums in a particular manner so as to displace a lawfully-made executive decision. The budget amendment was a contingency allocation available to the Mayor rather than a binding instruction and did not fall within paragraphs 2 or 3 of schedule 4 to the 2000 Regulations; the Mayor’s refusal to implement the expenditure was therefore lawful.