Coleman, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Barnet Council & Ors

A public authority’s equality duty requires due regard to the statutory needs, not achievement of a particular result. In a planning case, the authority must understand the effects of the proposal on persons sharing protected characteristics, obtain sufficient relevant information, and undertake the statutory balancing exercise as an integral part of its decision. It need not disaggregate every form or degree of disability, or conduct a formal equality impact assessment, unless the circumstances require that level of analysis. Harm to protected groups does not dictate refusal of planning permission. It may be outweighed by material countervailing considerations. Planning conditions may refer to a community access scheme secured by an existing Town and Country Planning Act 1990 obligation, and reasons for granting permission need only summarise the reasons for the grant.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Council’s grant of planning permission for the conversion of a former garden centre into a Jewish free school. He relied on the effects of the loss of the garden centre on elderly and disabled residents and advanced seven grounds, including alleged failure to comply with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, defects in the section 106 obligation, unlawful conditions, failure to consider alternative sites, inadequate consultation, traffic and parking errors, and inadequate reasons.

The claim followed an earlier planning permission for the same development, which had been quashed by consent after the Council conceded that it had failed to discharge the equality duty. The central issue was whether the Council had lawfully complied with section 149 when determining the second application.

1. Outcome. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted, but the claim was dismissed.
2. Equality duty. The duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is a duty to have due regard to the statutory needs, not a duty to achieve a particular result. The regard required is that which is appropriate in all the circumstances, including the importance and extent of the disadvantage and relevant countervailing factors. Performance must be substantive, rigorous, undertaken with an open mind, and integrated into the decision-making process.
3. In a planning decision, the authority must understand the range and significance of the effects on persons with relevant protected characteristics and have sufficient information before it to conduct the necessary balancing exercise. It need not analyse every individual’s circumstances or separately examine each type or degree of disability. A formal equality impact assessment was not required on these facts.
4. The Council had properly identified age and disability as relevant protected characteristics, consulted widely, analysed the representations, understood the effects of the garden centre’s loss, and placed significant weight on those effects. It was entitled to balance them against the need for school places, planning policy supporting new schools, and the fact that the garden centre had already closed. The balance was lawful.
5. The section 106 obligation was enforceable against the Trust and successors in title under section 106(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Community Access Plan could lawfully be left for later approval. Conditions 3 and 4 were sufficiently clear when read with the obligation and did not require a further planning obligation.
6. The temporary school permission was a material consideration. The Council had also considered alternative sites, and disagreement with its planning judgment did not establish an error of law. Consultation, traffic and parking assessments were adequate. Under article 22(1)(b)(i) of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, the reasons for granting permission need only summarise the reasons for the grant, which the Council’s decision notice did.