R (Coleman) v London Borough of Barnet

The claim challenged the London Borough of Barnet’s grant of planning permission for a free school on the former Wyevale Garden Centre site, principally on the ground that the Council had failed to discharge the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The court treated whether the Council had given "due regard" to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between persons with the protected characteristics of age and disability and others as the central question.

The judge concluded that the Council had properly discharged the duty: the planning officers had identified the equality issues, set out and analysed the consultation responses (including targeted consultation of users with disabilities and elderly residents), examined alternative facilities locally, and explained the weight to be given to the equality impacts alongside countervailing factors such as the identified need for school places. The officer report and the decision notice demonstrated substance rather than form in meeting section 149.

The court also rejected additional grounds: the section 106 agreement (and deed of variation) adequately secured community access; conditions 3 and 4 of the permission were lawful and not impermissibly vague; the extant temporary permission for the school at 80 Daws Lane and the search for alternative sites were rightly treated as relevant; consultation was thorough and fair; traffic, parking and travel-plan issues were properly considered; and the decision notice gave adequate summary reasons. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.

Background and parties: The claimant, a local resident who is disabled, sought judicial review of Barnet Council’s 30 March 2012 grant of planning permission for Etz Chaim Free School on land formerly occupied by Wyevale Garden Centre. The interested party was the school trustees who had acquired a long lease. The garden centre had closed and many local objections emphasised loss of an accessible recreational and educational facility for elderly and disabled users.

Nature of the application and relief sought: The claimant sought judicial review of the Council’s decision, asserting principally that the Council failed to discharge its duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010; relief sought included quashing the planning permission. An earlier interim injunction application had been refused.

Issues before the court: The judge identified seven issues: (1) whether the Council lawfully discharged the section 149 duty; (2) adequacy of the section 106 obligation securing community access; (3) lawfulness and precision of conditions 3 and 4; (4) relevance of an extant temporary permission and adequacy of consideration of alternative sites; (5) adequacy of consultation; (6) consideration of traffic and parking impacts; and (7) adequacy of reasons in the decision notice.

Court’s reasoning (concise):

• Equality duty (section 149): the court applied authorities establishing that the duty requires "due regard" in substance, not a guaranteed outcome, and that regard must be appropriate in the circumstances. The officer report expressly quoted and addressed section 149, recorded detailed consultation responses from elderly and disabled users, analysed alternative local facilities and weighed harms to protected groups against countervailing planning considerations (including a demonstrable need for school places). The report treated equality matters as an integral part of decision-making and advised the committee that significant weight should be given to impacts on protected groups; the members accepted that advice. The court held this was a lawful and adequate discharge of the duty.
• Section 106 obligation and deed of variation: the planning obligation (and later deed of variation) required submission and implementation of a Community Access Plan; the court held this arrangement lawful and sufficiently certain and enforceable against successors under section 106(3) of the 1990 Act.
• Conditions 3 and 4: those conditions regulate use and hours and do not unlawfully compel entry into a planning obligation nor are they so vague as to be unenforceable; they operate coherently with the section 106 obligation already in place.
• Temporary permission and alternative sites: the existence of a temporary school site and the need for a permanent site were material considerations the Council properly took into account; the Council considered alternative sites and was entitled to rely on its planning judgment.
• Consultation: the Council’s consultation (including targeted follow-up) exceeded statutory minimums, and producing an addendum to update officers’ advice shortly before committee was reasonable; no substantive new material was shown to have been ignored.
• Traffic and parking: officers examined the applicant’s transport submissions, local surveys and their own comparative surveys, and imposed a School Travel Plan requirement; the court would not substitute its view for that planning judgment.
• Reasons: the decision notice gave an adequate summary of reasons and expressly recorded that the Council had "paid due regard" to equality issues and balanced impacts against the benefits of providing education places; the summary met the statutory requirement for a reasons summary.

Conclusion and remedy: The judge granted permission to apply for judicial review but dismissed the substantive claim, concluding the Council had properly discharged its equality duty and acted lawfully on the other issues.

The claim is dismissed. The court held that Barnet Council lawfully discharged its public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010: the officers’ report and decision process showed that the statutory requirements were considered in substance and with appropriate rigour, and the adverse equality impacts were weighed against legitimate countervailing planning considerations (including an identified need for school places). The court also found the section 106 obligation (as varied), conditions 3 and 4, consultation, consideration of alternative sites, treatment of traffic and parking, and the summary reasons in the decision notice to be lawful and adequate, so no relief was granted to the claimant.