Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police and another (Scotland)

A claim for damages arising from completed acts or omissions which allegedly breached a Convention right may proceed by ordinary action. Judicial review is unnecessary where the claimant neither seeks to control or set aside a public authority’s decision nor needs such relief as a foundation for the damages claim.

Separate but interconnected claims against different defenders may be combined in one Scottish action unless their joinder is likely to cause manifest inconvenience or injustice. The court should take a pragmatic approach, using available case-management powers. It remains incompetent to seek one lump-sum decree against defenders for separate wrongs.

The appellant alleged that Strathclyde police officers assaulted and mistreated him following his arrest. He sought damages from the Chief Constable at common law and under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also sought damages from the Chief Constable and Lord Advocate for failure to conduct an effective investigation.

The sheriff rejected the procedural article 3 claim, and the Sheriff Principal refused an appeal. The Inner House held the entire action incompetent: [2011] CSIH 16, 2011 SC 527. It reasoned that the Convention claims required judicial review and that distinct claims against different defenders could not be combined as pleaded.

The Supreme Court had to decide whether the damages claims required judicial review and whether all the claims could competently proceed in one action.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Hope delivered the judgment, with which Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed agreed. The Inner House’s interlocutor was recalled and the action was held competent.
2. The Convention claims did not invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session. The appellant sought damages for completed acts and omissions. He did not seek to review, control or set aside any decision of the Chief Constable or Lord Advocate, and no such order was needed as a foundation for relief. Judicial review was therefore inappropriate for both the substantive and procedural article 3 claims. The number of alleged acts did not alter that conclusion: paras 15–21.
3. The supervisory jurisdiction exists to ensure that a person entrusted with power does not exceed or abuse that jurisdiction or fail to perform its requirements. An ordinary damages action based on completed conduct is not converted into judicial review merely because it has a public-law dimension. The court endorsed the reasoning in Docherty v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSIH 58 permitting comparable Convention damages claims to proceed by ordinary action: paras 17–20.
4. Scottish procedure prohibits a pursuer from seeking one lump-sum decree against defenders for separate wrongs. That rule was not infringed. The first crave was directed against the Chief Constable, while the second related to the alleged investigatory failure by the Chief Constable and Lord Advocate. The appellant did not seek a single lump sum from both defenders for all the separate wrongs: paras 22–25.
5. Outside that prohibition, the guiding question is whether combining separate claims is likely to cause manifest inconvenience and injustice. The court must act pragmatically, consider fairness to every party and use available case-management procedures. There is no absolute rule requiring joinder or separation: para 32.
6. The claims were interconnected in fact and law. Proof of the investigation claim would require evidence concerning the alleged mistreatment which also supported the substantive claim. Requiring that evidence twice would be inconvenient and potentially unjust. The Procurator Fiscal’s lack of involvement in the first claim created no material case-management difficulty: para 33.
7. The case was returned to the Inner House for determination of the appeal against the Sheriff Principal’s interlocutor: para 35.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Allowed the appeal unanimously, recalled the Inner House’s interlocutor, found the action competent and returned the case to the Inner House for the outstanding appeal.
2. Inner House of the Court of Session: In [2011] CSIH 16, 2011 SC 527, held the action as a whole incompetent and dismissed it.
3. Sheriff Principal: Refused the appellant’s appeal on 25 April 2008, while permitting amendment of the second crave.
4. Glasgow Sheriff Court: Held the procedural article 3 claim irrelevant, excluded that claim against the Chief Constable from proof and dismissed the action against the Lord Advocate.