Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police and another (Scotland)

The Supreme Court held that the pursuer's claims for damages founded on alleged breaches of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and for common law assault were competent as ordinary actions in the sheriff court and did not require to be pursued by way of judicial review. The court rejected the Extra Division's view that the human rights elements of the craves were effectively applications for supervisory review. The court also rejected the objection that the two distinct craves and multiple defenders rendered the single action incompetent: the pleadings disclosed separate but interconnected causes of action which could practicably and fairly be tried together. The court therefore recalled the Extra Division's interlocutor and remitted the case to the Inner House for further hearing on the appeal against the Sheriff Principal's interlocutor.

Background and procedural history

The appellant, Kevin Ruddy, alleged assault, threats and other ill-treatment by officers of Strathclyde Police during and after his removal to Glasgow and sought damages. He intimated an application for civil legal aid to the Chief Constable, which was treated as a complaint and investigated by the Complaints and Discipline Branch; the Procurator Fiscal thereafter declined criminal prosecution. In August 2005 the appellant commenced proceedings in the sheriff court seeking damages on two separate craves: (1) common law damages against the Chief Constable and just satisfaction under section 8(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 for breach of article 3 (substantive); and (2) just satisfaction under section 8(3) HRA and section 100(3) Scotland Act 1998 for failure to conduct an effective investigation into the article 3 complaint (procedural) against the Chief Constable and the Lord Advocate.

Procedural posture

• The sheriff held parts of the claim irrelevant and dismissed the action as to the Lord Advocate; the Sheriff Principal refused the appellant's appeal (25 April 2008).
• The appellant appealed to the Inner House. The Extra Division raised fundamental competency issues and, in an opinion ([2011] CSIH 16, 2011 SC 527), held the action incompetent and dismissed it.
• The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues for decision

• Whether the substantive and/or procedural article 3 claims (and the HRA section 8(3) remedy) required to be brought by way of judicial review rather than by ordinary action in the sheriff court.
• Whether it was competent to combine a common law assault claim and article 3 procedural and substantive claims against two different defenders in one action.

Court's reasoning

The court explained that the objection that the claims raised matters for supervisory review misunderstood the pursuer's case: he sought damages for completed acts or omissions, not orders setting aside administrative decisions or directing future conduct. Established authorities did not mandate that all claims with a public law dimension must be litigated by judicial review; the relevant test is whether the choice of procedure is critical to the outcome or whether supervisory remedies are required to provide the basis for private rights. The court identified English and Scottish authorities showing the shift away from an absolute rule requiring judicial review where public law elements were present, and emphasised that damages claims based on alleged breaches of Convention rights can be appropriately advanced by ordinary action where the remedy sought is monetary relief for past wrongs.

On the competency of combining claims, the court accepted the principle that separate and unconnected wrongs should not be sued for in a single lump-sum conclusion against multiple defenders, but found that the present craves were separate yet factually and legally interconnected. That interconnection made it convenient and fair to hear them together; the pleadings did not produce undue complexity or injustice. Accordingly, the court rejected the Extra Division's grounds for dismissing the action as incompetent.

Wider comment: the court noted the rarity of compelling the use of judicial review where damages for past breaches of Convention rights are sought and endorsed a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to competency and case management.

The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's claims for damages for alleged breaches of article 3 (both substantive and procedural) and the common law assault claim were competent as ordinary actions in the sheriff court and did not require to be pursued by judicial review. The court also held that it was competent to join the distinct but interconnected claims against the named defenders in one action and recalled the Extra Division's interlocutor, remitting the case to the Inner House for further hearing.

Sheriff Court (Glasgow) – initial hearing and debate leading to interlocutors (2007); appeal to Sheriff Principal refused (25 April 2008); appeal to Inner House (Extra Division) where the court issued an opinion and dismissed the action as incompetent ([2011] CSIH 16, 2011 SC 527); appeal to the Supreme Court ([2012] UKSC 57) where the appeal was allowed and the Extra Division's interlocutor recalled.