Global Torch Ltd. & Ors v Apex Global Management

On an oral renewal of an application for permission to appeal, permission should be granted where reasonable grounds of appeal or a compelling reason to proceed are shown. Pressure on the court timetable should not defeat permission once that threshold is met. In privacy proceedings, it was arguable that an interim application under CPR 39.2(3)(g) had to be considered in the Convention context, balancing open justice and privacy rights under Articles 6, 8 and 10. It was also arguable that the application had been approached using an excessively high, summary-judgment standard. The Court of Appeal granted permission without determining the substantive privacy issues.

The applications arose from shareholder prejudice petitions concerning Fi Call Limited. Global Torch and Apex each presented a petition under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006. The Princes, who were respondents to Apex’s petition, sought private hearings and restrictions on access to court documents while immunity and jurisdiction issues remained unresolved.

Mr Justice Morgan rejected the privacy applications in a judgment reported at [2013] EWHC 223 (Ch), while granting interim protection pending a possible appeal. Lewison LJ refused permission on the papers. On oral renewal, the central issue was whether the proposed appeal disclosed arguable legal misdirections or a compelling reason for the appeal to proceed.

Permission to appeal granted. Lord Justice Lloyd held that the applications raised reasonable grounds of appeal and that the importance of the issues supplied a compelling reason for the appeal to proceed.

1. The applications concerned private hearings under CPR 39.2(3) and restrictions on access to court-file documents under CPR 5.4C. The Court of Appeal was deciding permission only and did not determine whether the allegations should ultimately be heard in private or withheld from public access.
2. In relation to CPR 39.2(3)(g), the relevant context was informed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The court had to address the competing requirements of open justice and the rights protected by Articles 6, 8 and 10. It was arguable that the judge had failed to ask the adapted question identified from paragraph 52 of Re Guardian News and Media [2010] 2 AC 697: whether the public interest in reporting the proceedings and the allegations justified curtailing the appellants’ and their families’ private-life rights.
3. It was also arguable that the judge had imposed too high a threshold by approaching the interim application as if it required a summary judgment assessment of the allegations. At the jurisdiction stage, the merits could be examined more fully and an informed view could then be taken of whether the allegations were false, malicious or an abuse of process.
4. The procedural pressure created by the proposed expedited appeal was not a sufficient reason to refuse permission. The court granted permission on all grounds rather than separating the stronger and weaker grounds, and directed that the appeal proceed on an expedited basis.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On oral renewal, Lord Justice Lloyd granted permission to appeal and directed that the appeal proceed on an expedited basis.
2. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Morgan J rejected the Princes’ privacy applications, while granting interim protection pending a possible appeal, in [2013] EWHC 223 (Ch).
3. Court of Appeal (on the papers): Lewison LJ refused permission to appeal, following which the oral renewal was made.