The President of the Methodist Conference v Preston

The central issue was whether a Methodist minister, Ms Preston, was an "employee" for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (notably s 94 and the statutory definition in s 230). The majority held that she was not.

The court examined the Deed of Union and the Methodist standing orders and concluded that the ministerial relationship is a life-long covenant governed by the Church’s constitutional rules and the stationing process. Those features (the manner of engagement, the continuation of stipend and manse by virtue of admission into full connexion, the inability to resign unilaterally and the Church’s exclusive power to station or remove ministers) meant the parties did not intend a contract of employment to arise in the ordinary way.

The decision considered and applied Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland [2006] 2 AC 28 but distinguished its application: Percy does not displace the relevance of the particular constitutional framework governing Methodist ministry. The courts below were criticised for over-analysing Percy and not sufficiently taking the Deed of Union and standing orders into account.

Background and procedural posture. The respondent, a Methodist minister, sought to bring an unfair dismissal claim under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (s 94). The employment tribunal held she was not an employee. That decision was reversed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal ([2011] ICR 819) and the reversal was upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2012] QB 735; [2011] EWCA Civ 1581). The President of the Methodist Conference appealed to the Supreme Court.

Nature of the claim. An application/claim for unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 was pursued; the threshold question was whether the respondent was an "employee" within the statutory definition (s 230) so as to attract the protection of s 94.

Issues framed by the court. (i) Whether the relationship between a minister in full connexion and the Methodist Church gives rise to legal relations amounting to a contract of employment; (ii) whether the particular circumstances of Ms Preston’s stationing (invitation, acceptance and five-year term) created a contractual employment relationship despite the Church’s constitutional framework; (iii) how Percy v Board of National Mission should be applied to the facts.

Facts and material background. The respondent was ordained and in full connexion with the Methodist Church; the Church’s governance is set out in the Deed of Union and detailed standing orders which regulate admission, stationing (the annual or exceptional assignment of ministers to circuits), stipends, manses and disciplinary procedures. The respondent accepted an invitation from a circuit to serve as a superintendent minister for five years and exchanged letters of invitation and acceptance. The standing orders, however, make clear that circuits only propose appointments and the Conference (or its delegated officer between Conferences) makes the stationing decision.

Court’s reasoning and conclusion. The majority (Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath agreed, and Lord Hope concurring) rejected an argument that an employment contract should be implied by necessity or inferred readily simply because stipends, manses and duties are specified. They regarded the Deed of Union and standing orders as the primary factual matrix: the ministerial relationship is a vocation marked by a life-long covenant, duties and benefits arising from admission into full connexion rather than from the ordinary bilateral formation of a contract of service. Three cumulative features were decisive: (1) the manner of engagement (ordination and admission into full connexion and the stationing regime) is not capable of contractual formation in the usual sense; (2) stipend and manse arise by virtue of ministerial status and continue through illness etc., pointing to provision rather than contractual consideration; (3) the relationship is not terminable by unilateral resignation but by Church bodies. The majority therefore allowed the appeal and restored the tribunal’s dismissal of the unfair dismissal claim. The court criticised the lower courts for over-emphasising Percy and for treating the circuit invitation and acceptance as constituting a contract outside the Church’s constitutional framework.

Separate and dissenting opinion. Lady Hale dissented. She argued the arrangement for a particular station (specific duties, specified stipend and manse, defined period) bore the hallmarks of an employment contract and that the EAT and Court of Appeal were correct to find an employment relationship.

Wider context and unresolved questions. The court noted Percy remains an important authority but that its statements must be read in context. The majority indicated briefly that claims to the stipend and manse might be enforceable as trusts of Church property but preferred to leave that question to a future case with fuller material.

Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court restored the employment tribunal’s order dismissing Ms Preston’s unfair dismissal claim. The majority held that, on the facts and against the background of the Deed of Union and standing orders, the ministerial relationship was a vocation governed by the Church’s constitution and stationing process rather than a contract of employment; the manner of engagement, the status-based entitlement to stipend and manse, and the absence of unilateral right to resign were cumulatively decisive. A dissent (Lady Hale) would have dismissed the appeal, treating the stationing arrangement as contractual.

Employment Tribunal: held respondent not an employee (claim dismissed). Employment Appeal Tribunal: reversed and held she was an employee ([2011] ICR 819). Court of Appeal: upheld the EAT ([2012] QB 735; [2011] EWCA Civ 1581). Supreme Court: allowed the appellant’s appeal and restored the tribunal’s dismissal ([2013] UKSC 29).