The President of the Methodist Conference v Preston

A minister of religion is neither presumed to be an employee nor presumed to lack contractual status. The court must examine how the minister was engaged, the particular church’s rules and practices, any special arrangements, and the parties’ objective intention to create legal relations.

Payment of a stipend, accommodation and defined duties do not alone establish a contract. A lifelong ministry governed by a church constitution may confer rights and duties through status rather than agreement. An invitation to a particular post creates no separate contract where it forms only part of a constitutional stationing process and the governing body retains the power of appointment.

A Methodist minister sought to bring an unfair dismissal claim. Under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, that right was available only to an employee, as defined by section 230.

The Employment Tribunal held that the minister was not an employee. The Employment Appeal Tribunal reversed that decision, reported at [2011] ICR 819, and the Court of Appeal upheld the reversal in [2011] EWCA Civ 1581, reported at [2012] QB 735.

The central issue was whether the Church’s constitutional documents and the correspondence inviting the minister to a five-year circuit appointment created a contract of employment.

1. Appeal allowed by a majority. Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath agreed, held that the respondent was not employed under a contract. Lord Hope agreed with his reasons. The order of the Employment Tribunal dismissing the claim was restored. Lady Hale dissented.

2. The question was not governed by a presumption against contractual relations. Nor could it be answered by classifying ministry as an office, a spiritual calling or a secular occupation. Following and explaining Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland [2005] UKHL 73, the court had to examine the manner of engagement, the governing rules and practices of the particular church, any special arrangements, and the parties’ objective intention.

3. The Church’s Deed of Union and standing orders documented the relationship in detail. The issue was therefore not whether a contract had to be implied as a matter of necessity. It was whether the incidents of the documented relationship were objectively contractual and, if so, whether they constituted employment.

4. Three cumulative features showed that the general relationship arose from ecclesiastical status rather than contract. Admission into full connexion and ordination were not consensual acts of contractual formation, and subsequent duties depended upon unilateral decisions of the Conference. The stipend and manse were incidents of full connexion and continued during sickness or injury. The lifelong relationship was not unilaterally terminable by the minister, because resignation required acceptance under the Church’s procedures.

5. The Redruth Circuit’s invitation and the minister’s acceptance did not create a separate five-year contract. Under the standing orders, a circuit could only propose a candidate. The Conference retained the appointment and stationing power and could move a minister before the invited period expired. The respondent accordingly served at Redruth under the pre-existing lifelong constitutional relationship established upon ordination.

6. Lord Sumption considered that the courts below had read Percy too narrowly. Stipend, accommodation and identified duties did not themselves establish contractual intention. The spiritual character of ministry remained relevant factual background, although it created no presumption. The arrangements considered in President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt [1984] QB 368 remained an example of non-contractual ministry.

7. Lady Hale would have dismissed the appeal. She considered the particular station to be a specific, time-limited arrangement with duties, stipend and accommodation, made nationally after local invitation and acceptance. In her view it was a contract of employment distinct from the minister’s lifelong admission into full connexion.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: By a majority of four to one, allowed the appeal and restored the Employment Tribunal’s order dismissing the claim: [2013] UKSC 29.

2. Court of Appeal: Upheld the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s conclusion that the respondent was an employee: [2011] EWCA Civ 1581; [2012] QB 735.

3. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Reversed the Employment Tribunal and held that the respondent was an employee: [2011] ICR 819.

4. Employment Tribunal: Held that the respondent was not an employee and dismissed her unfair dismissal claim.