Hainsworth v Ministry of Defence

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's challenge that Article 5 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC required an employer to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the needs of a disabled person associated with an employee (here the employee's daughter). The court concluded that Article 5 is focussed on measures for disabled employees, prospective employees and trainees and cannot be read to impose an open‑ended duty in respect of persons who are not themselves employees or applicants. The judgment held that Coleman v Attridge Law confirmed the distinct scope of Article 5 and that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and other international materials did not alter Article 5's plain meaning. The court further held that, even if Article 5 were read as the appellant suggested, it would be insufficiently precise to be directly effective against the Ministry of Defence. The appeal was therefore dismissed and no reference to the Court of Justice was made.

The appellant was a civilian teacher employed by the Ministry of Defence in Germany. Her daughter, Charlotte, had Down's syndrome and could not be educated at the Service Children's Education facilities in Germany. The appellant asked for a compassionate transfer to the United Kingdom so as to meet her daughter's educational needs; the request was refused and the appellant brought complaints based on the duty to make reasonable adjustments.

The EAT, by Langstaff J under Rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules 1993, had held that Ground 2 of the appellant's appeal disclosed no reasonable grounds. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Equality and Human Rights Commission was permitted to intervene.

The core issue was whether Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC (the reasonable accommodation obligation) required employers to make adjustments that would benefit a disabled person who was not the employee or an applicant but was associated with the employee (in this case the employee's daughter). Secondary issues were whether domestic law (notably section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010 and Schedule 8 paragraph 5(1)) should be read down to give effect to Article 5 and whether Article 5 was directly effective against an emanation of the State.

The court analysed the language of Article 5 and the Directive's recitals and concluded that the provision is expressly and naturally directed to enabling disabled persons to access, participate in or advance in employment or undergo training: the disabled person envisaged is the employee, prospective employee or trainee. The court held Coleman v Attridge Law to be consistent with that approach. Attempts to import a broader obligation from other recitals, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the EU Charter or other instruments were rejected as unable to displace Article 5's plain meaning without undermining legal certainty. The court also concluded that, on the appellant's broader reading, Article 5 would be too vague and insufficiently precise to have direct effect. The court declined to refer a question to the Court of Justice under Article 267. Consequently the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. The court held that Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC is directed to reasonable accommodation for disabled employees, prospective employees and trainees and does not impose an open‑ended duty in respect of third persons associated with employees. The court further held that, if read as the appellant proposed, Article 5 would be insufficiently precise to be directly effective, and domestic statutory provisions (notably section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010 and Schedule 8 paragraph 5(1)) could not be read down to give the appellant the relied‑upon right.

Appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal given by Langstaff J on 16 July 2013 under Rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules 1993; permission to appeal to this court was granted by Lewison LJ on 21 November 2013. The matter had earlier been considered by HHJ Richardson on 10 April 2013 under Rule 3(7).