Singh v Singh & Anor

The claimant alleged that property held in the sole names of family members (notably Tetworth Hall and certain shareholdings in Edwardian Group Limited) was beneficially held as "joint family property" governed by the Mitakshara (Hindu/Sikh joint family) principles. The claim was advanced in English law by way of a common intention constructive trust and relied on evidence that the family had lived and acted as a joint Hindu family. The court reviewed the Mitakshara principles (including ancestral property, "throwing in", partition, coparcenary rights and the effect of the Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930), considered expert evidence, and applied the Stack v Dowden / Jones v Kernott approach to common intention constructive trusts.

The judge found there was no reliable evidence of a common understanding between the claimant and the defendants that property acquired by family members would be held as joint family property under Mitakshara principles. Documentary records, wills, company declarations, tax returns, and the conduct of advisers and family members were inconsistent with the alleged joint-family ownership; there was no proven act of "throwing-in" nor sufficient evidence to displace the presumption that assets held in a person’s sole name were beneficially that person’s. The claim therefore failed.

Background and parties: The claimant (Father) sued his elder son (first defendant) and the younger son (second defendant) over asserted beneficial ownership of family assets, including Tetworth Hall and personal shareholdings in Edwardian Group Limited (EGL). The claimant’s case was that the Singh family were a joint Hindu (Sikh) family and that family assets were held as "joint family property" under the Mitakshara, giving rise in English law to a common intention constructive trust.

Nature of the application and procedural posture: First-instance trial in the Chancery Division. Newey J had earlier directed a trial of preliminary issues limited to (a) whether there was a common understanding that property would be subject to joint Hindu family principles, (b) if so whether a constructive trust arose under English law, and (c) if so what its terms were. The claimant later sought, late in the trial, to add an alternative head of claim that Indian personal law (by reason of domicile) applied; the judge refused that late amendment.

Issues before the court:

• Whether there was a common understanding between the claimant and the defendants that assets acquired by any family member were to be treated as joint family property governed by the Mitakshara;
• If yes, whether those assets were held subject to a constructive trust under English law and on what terms;
• Whether the claimant could amend late in the trial to rely alternatively on Indian personal law by reason of domicile.

Evidence and experts: Both parties called experts on Mitakshara and Hindu family law. The court found strengths and weaknesses in each expert’s evidence: one expert focused on sociological and customary perceptions, the other on black-letter doctrine and practice. The judge also examined documentary and witness evidence spanning decades (company accounts, wills, trust settlements, tax returns, minutes and correspondence) and observed shortcomings in the claimant’s oral evidence and that of his wife.

Reasoning and subsidiary findings: The judge summarised the Mitakshara rules (coparcenary membership, ancestral property, "throwing-in", partition, and the impact of statutory reform including the Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930 and Hindu Succession legislation). He emphasised that mere family living or a family business does not by itself produce joint family property; there must be proof that property became joint by reference to recognised routes (ancestral descent, partition or unequivocal "throwing-in"). The court found pervasive documentary and conduct-based evidence inconsistent with any shared intention to treat the assets at issue as joint family property: assets and dividends were declared and treated as individually owned; wills and trust settlements treated shares as personal / trust property; tax returns and advisers treated ownership as individual; and core documents recorded sole ownership. The claimant did not plead or prove the specific acts of "throwing-in" and his contemporaneous conduct did not support the pleaded Mitakshara regime. The late proposed amendment to base the claim on Indian personal law by reason of domicile was refused as introducing a fundamentally different case too late and raising significant additional issues and prejudice.

Conclusion: The judge answered the primary preliminary issue in the negative and dismissed the claim; the constructive trust issues therefore did not arise.

The claim is dismissed. The court held that the claimant failed to prove a common understanding that property held legally by family members was to be treated as joint family property under the Mitakshara, and the documentary and conduct evidence contradicted such a claim. A late amendment to plead Indian personal law by reason of domicile was refused as prejudicial and raising a materially different case.