West & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Rhondda Cynon Taff County Borough Council

A local authority considering changes to nursery education must identify and address its statutory duties before making the decision. It must ask what provision is sufficient for its area and must assess the effect of reduced education on childcare provision, including whether childcare will remain sufficient to meet parental needs.

Decision-makers must have regard to relevant statutory guidance and take reasonable steps to obtain the information needed to answer the correct questions. A general consideration of consultation responses or budgetary pressures is not enough where the statutory framework and relevant issues are not identified. The public sector equality duty involves a threshold question whether due regard was given, followed by ordinary rationality review of the resulting decision.

The claimants challenged the defendant council’s decision to replace publicly funded full-time nursery education for three-year-olds with up to 15 hours a week from September 2014. The change affected more than 3,300 children and their families and also affected free school meals and transport.

The claim alleged failures to comply with statutory duties concerning nursery education, childcare, children in need, child poverty and equality. The council had undertaken consultation and prepared equality impact assessments, but the cabinet papers did not set out most of the relevant statutory duties or provide the childcare sufficiency assessments. The central issues were whether the council had properly addressed its statutory duties and whether the claim had been brought promptly.

1. Grounds (1), (2) and (4) succeeded. The council’s decision was unlawful and was quashed. Permission was granted on all grounds, but grounds (3) and (5) were not made out.
2. Under School Standards and Framework Act 1998, section 118, the council had to secure nursery education sufficient for its area. The cabinet papers wrongly presented the statutory obligation as requiring only ten hours per week. The council did not ask what provision was sufficient, and there was no evidence that 15 hours had been considered sufficient rather than merely affordable or appropriate in the light of budgetary pressures.
3. The sufficiency of nursery education was materially connected with the council’s duty under section 22 of the Childcare Act 2006. The council had to consider whether childcare provision would remain sufficient after the proposed reduction, including the needs of working parents, disabled children and Welsh-language provision. Relevant statutory guidance was mandatory, but the cabinet was not given the statutory framework, the relevant childcare sufficiency assessments, or an analysis of the likely position after implementation.
4. The duties under sections 17 and 18 of the Children Act 1989 required proper consideration of services for children in need. Although the council recognised that vulnerable children might face increased risks at home, the cabinet was not referred to the statutory duties and the equality impact assessment did not properly analyse the effect on childcare for children in need.
5. The child-poverty challenge failed because the consultation material and equality impact assessment addressed social deprivation and vulnerable groups. The public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 was also satisfied. The court must first decide whether the statutory threshold of due regard was met; only then does it review the resulting decision on ordinary rationality grounds. The assessment had deficiencies, but they did not establish failure to discharge the duty.
6. The claim was brought promptly. The operative date was 20 January 2014, when the scrutiny process ended and the decision took effect, although the claim was in time even if time ran from 8 January. The council had been put on notice before setting its budget, and the delay was justified.
7. The claimants were awarded 85 per cent of their costs. The interim costs application was adjourned for written representations.

First-instance judicial review decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.