Robson & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v Salford City Council (Rev 1)

A local authority may change the method by which it arranges transport under section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970, provided that suitable facilities or assistance remain available for each eligible person. A high-level policy decision is not unlawful merely because individual arrangements may later prove inadequate. Individual assessments and decisions must still satisfy the statutory duty and may be challenged separately.

Consultation must be fair, but imperfect clarity will not invalidate it unless the process was clearly and radically unfair. The public sector equality duty requires due regard to relevant equality needs, information and mitigation. Its intensity depends on the nature and stage of the decision, and the process must be assessed as a whole.

The claimants were severely disabled adults receiving transport through Salford City Council’s Passenger Transport Unit to attend adult day centres. The Council decided to withdraw that directly provided service and replace it with individualised arrangements, including taxis, ring-and-ride services, mobility vehicles and financial or other support.

They sought judicial review on four grounds: breach of section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970; failure to reassess needs before withdrawing the service; inadequate consultation; and breach of the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The central issue was whether the high-level decision was unlawful before the individual transport arrangements had been finally determined.

1. Statutory duty and assessment. The claim failed. Section 2(1)(d) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 required arrangements for suitable facilities or assistance in travelling, but did not require direct provision by the Council. The obligation could be met through commissioned providers, taxis, mobility vehicles or financial assistance.
2. The challenged decision was a high-level choice about the method of performing the statutory duty. Its legality depended on whether suitable arrangements could be made for individual users. The evidence did not establish that any user necessarily required the Passenger Transport Unit. The Council was therefore not required to complete the full reassessment alleged before making the policy decision.
3. Although the evidence might have supported challenges to individual assessments, the claimants had challenged only the high-level decision. Such individual decisions could be challenged separately if the Council failed to arrange safe and suitable transport. The letters sent to the claimants were final decisions subject to further assistance or appeal, not merely provisional decisions, but that issue was not properly pleaded as an individual challenge.
4. Consultation. The consultation was sufficiently fair overall. The booklet did not expressly state that the existing service would close, but it explained the proposed move to alternative transport and made the intended scale of change reasonably apparent. Any lack of clarity did not amount to the clear and radical unfairness required to invalidate the process.
5. Equality duty. The Council had gathered relevant information, consulted service users and carers, analysed common concerns and considered mitigation. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 imposed a continuing duty, but the detail required at the high-level policy stage was less intense than for individual transport decisions. The assessment had to be read as a whole, without excessive forensic analysis, and the court could not substitute its view of the weight to be given to competing considerations.
6. The claim was dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused. The judge indicated obiter that, had the consultation or equality ground succeeded, the appropriate remedy would have been to quash the decision, not to require continued provision through the Passenger Transport Unit.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim was dismissed and permission to appeal was refused.