Radha Naran Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention must be used only for an authorised statutory purpose, for a reasonable period and as a last resort. The detaining authority must establish lawful justification and must act rationally, fairly and in accordance with relevant policy. Assistance or family help does not necessarily amount to employment. A different purpose for entry must be distinguished from a later change of circumstances. Where a refusal decision is withdrawn and no lawful replacement decision is made within the prescribed period, the entrant may become entitled to leave to enter rather than temporary admission. Deliberately fabricated interview evidence, oppressive detention and subsequent attempts to conceal the unlawfulness may justify substantial damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages.

The claimant, an Indian national, obtained six-month visitor entry clearance following an appeal against an earlier refusal. On arrival at Heathrow, immigration officers alleged that she had admitted an intention to help her sister sew curtains for payment. Her leave to enter was suspended and she was detained, refused entry, issued with removal directions and detained pending removal.

The refusal and detention decisions were withdrawn on 28 May 2011, but she was released on temporary admission, her passport was retained and no formal grant of leave to enter was made. A later refusal decision was issued on alleged changed circumstances. The claimant pursued First-tier Tribunal appeals and judicial review, alleging fabricated interview notes, bullying, unlawful detention and breaches of articles 5, 8 and 14 of the ECHR. The central issues were the lawfulness of the detention and related decisions, the effect of withdrawing the original decision, and the damages recoverable.

1. Outcome. The claim succeeded. The claimant was falsely imprisoned and unlawfully detained between 23 and 29 May 2011. The detention and related immigration decisions were ultra vires, taken for an ulterior purpose, irrational, unreasonable and contrary to the Secretary of State’s detention policy.
2. The burden of establishing lawful justification for detention rested on the Secretary of State. The court applied a three-stage inquiry: whether the claimant was directly and intentionally detained; whether the detention exceeded jurisdiction or was for an ulterior purpose; and whether detention was reasonably necessary for the stated purpose on ordinary Wednesbury principles.
3. Temporary detention could lawfully be used only for further examination or investigation authorised by the Immigration Act 1971. It was not reasonably necessary where there was no reliable evidence that the claimant would abscond or fail to co-operate. Detention imposed to pressure her into making an admission was for an unauthorised purpose.
4. The alleged admissions were unreliable and had been deliberately fabricated. The court found that the claimant had consistently denied any intention to work or to be employed sewing curtains. The interview process materially breached the Border Force Operations Manual, including requirements concerning interpretation, note-taking, clarification of crucial admissions and communication with the sponsor.
5. Employment required at least a rudimentary quasi-employment relationship involving defined work, a hierarchical relationship and a minimal framework of rules and responsibility. Family assistance, domestic work or help in a family arrangement did not necessarily constitute employment.
6. The original refusal decision was based on a different purpose, not a change of circumstances. After it was withdrawn, the claimant was entitled to leave to enter unless a lawful replacement decision was made within the prescribed period. Releasing her on temporary admission and retaining her passport were unlawful.
7. The subsequent explanatory statements, fresh refusal decision and litigation conduct attempted to conceal the original unlawfulness and manufacture a defence. These matters aggravated the false imprisonment and breached articles 5, 8 and 14 of the ECHR. The claimant was awarded £110,000 in general, aggravated and human-rights damages and £15,000 in exemplary damages, together with declarations and costs subject to argument.

First instance judicial review judgment. The judgment records earlier First-tier Tribunal proceedings, including a decision dated 5 July 2011 treating the second appeal as withdrawn after the underlying decisions had been withdrawn, and a decision dated 24 January 2012 allowing the third appeal. No appellate decision concerning the present claim is stated.