Shergill v Khaira

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the High Court judge permitting the appellants to amend their particulars of claim. The court identified two preliminary issues of trust law that were plainly justiciable: (i) whether clause 5 of the 1991 Deed was invalid insofar as it purported to confer a power to appoint and dismiss trustees on anyone other than the original Holy Saint, and (ii) whether the reference to "his successor" in the 1991 Deed was limited to the immediate successor or extended to successive successors. The court explained that where donors create a vague or informal charitable purpose, trustees may properly execute a more formal deed prescribing the terms of the trust (relying on the principle in Attorney-General v Mathieson), and that trustees who have accepted office under a deed are generally not entitled to impugn the deed that confers their title. The court also held that issues which turn on religious doctrine or the truth of religious beliefs are not automatically non-justiciable: civil courts may determine religious questions so far as they are necessary to decide legal rights, including questions about the administration and beneficial ownership of property held on religious trusts. The Court of Appeal’s comprehensive stay for supposed non-justiciability was therefore incorrect insofar as it precluded adjudication of the first two issues, and the proceedings were remitted to the High Court for further directions, including as to the possible use of expert evidence.

The appeals arose from a dispute between competing groups associated with three Sikh gurdwaras in Bradford, Birmingham and High Wycombe. The property at Birmingham had been acquired following meetings in 1987 and subsequently held under a Deed of Trust executed in 1991. Clause 5 of the 1991 Deed purported to give the "Saint or his successor" the power to remove and appoint trustees. The appellants (who asserted that Sant Jeet Singh was the recognised successor to the First Holy Saint) sought declarations and relief to give effect to purported removals and appointments said to have been made by Sant Jeet Singh; the respondents contended that no such power could validly be conferred other than on the original Holy Saint and that the dispute raised non-justiciable religious issues.

Procedural history: the appellants issued proceedings in the High Court where Judge Cooke refused to strike out the claim and gave permission to amend the particulars of claim ([2011] EWHC 2442 (Ch)). The Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal on justiciability grounds and ordered a permanent stay ([2012] EWCA Civ 983 / [2012] PTSR 1697). The case reached the Supreme Court on the appellants’ appeal.

Nature of the claim and relief sought: the appellants sought declarations and ancillary relief in relation to trusteeship and management of the Birmingham (and Wycombe) gurdwaras, including declarations that the purported removals and appointments by Sant Jeet Singh were valid under the 1991 Deed.

Issues framed by the court: the Supreme Court focussed on four principal issues: (i) whether clause 5 of the 1991 Deed was invalid insofar as it conferred power to appoint and dismiss trustees on anyone other than the First Holy Saint; (ii) whether the term "successor" in the deed referred only to the immediate successor or to successive successors; (iii) whether Sant Jeet Singh was properly a successor to the First Holy Saint; and (iv) whether Sant Jeet Singh’s teachings or personal character disqualified him on grounds of departure from fundamental tenets.

Reasoning: on (i) the court explained the principle from Attorney-General v Mathieson that where donors give for general purposes trustees may properly execute a more precise trust instrument and that trustees who accept office under such a deed will generally be bound by it and cannot readily impugn it; accordingly clause 5 was at least arguable and not plainly invalid at interlocutory stage. On (ii) the court observed that the language of "his successor" could bear either meaning and that interpretation depended on factual context; this too was not appropriate to determine on the current interlocutory record. On (iii) and (iv) the court analysed the doctrine of non-justiciability and concluded that the presence of religious questions does not place them beyond adjudication where the resolution of those questions is necessary to decide civil rights under trusts or contracts; the historic authorities permit courts to ascertain fundamental tenets to identify beneficiaries entitled to trust property. The Court criticised the Court of Appeal's broad application of non-justiciability in this case and held that the High Court should be permitted to determine contested issues, albeit recognising that some factual and expert evidence on religious matters might be needed.

Disposition: the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reinstated Judge Cooke’s order permitting amendment, and remitted the proceedings to the High Court for further directions, noting that expert evidence on religious matters may be appropriate.

Appeal allowed. The Court restored the High Court judge’s order permitting amendment, rejected the Court of Appeal’s broad stay based on non-justiciability in respect of the preliminary trust construction issues, and remitted the proceedings to the High Court for further directions. Rationale: clauses of the 1991 Deed and the construction of the term "successor" raise matters of English trust law that are justiciable; courts may determine religious questions to the extent necessary to resolve civil rights and disputes over property held on religious trusts; the Court of Appeal was wrong to treat the whole dispute as non-justiciable.

On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Mummery LJ, Hooper and Pitchford LJJ) which allowed the respondents’ appeal and ordered a permanent stay [2012] EWCA Civ 983 / [2012] PTSR 1697. Underlying decision: permission to amend and refusal to strike out was given by His Honour Judge David Cooke in the High Court, Birmingham District Registry [2011] EWHC 2442 (Ch). The Supreme Court allowed the appellants’ appeal and remitted the matter to the High Court for further directions.