Telchadder v Wickland Holdings Limited

The Supreme Court considered the meaning and operation of paragraph 4 of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983. The court held that the requirement in para 4(a) for service of a notice to remedy and for failure to comply "within a reasonable time" applies in practice only to breaches that are capable of remedy. Where a breach of a covenant against anti-social behaviour is remediable, an occupier may comply with a notice by refraining from further offences for a reasonable period; by contrast some acts of anti-social behaviour may be so grave as to be irremediable, in which case a notice to remedy need not be required.

The court held that the phrase "within a reasonable time" should be given practical effect so that it is not read as permitting an owner to rely, many years later, on a single old breach to terminate an agreement. On the facts the period of almost three years between the notice and the later offending meant the occupier had complied for a reasonable time and the possession order could not properly be founded upon the 2006 notice.

The case concerned Wickland's application to terminate the licence of Mr Telchadder to station and occupy a mobile home at Meadowview Park, relying on paragraph 4 of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983. Wickland had served a notice to remedy after an incident in July 2006 in which the occupier startled a neighbour while wearing camouflage and a mask. No further qualifying breach occurred until July 2009 when the occupier made threats and engaged in other conduct. Wickland obtained an order terminating the licence in the county court; the Court of Appeal dismissed the occupier's appeal. The occupier appealed to the Supreme Court.

Nature of the application: Wickland sought termination of the agreement and possession (termination of the licence) under para 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1983 Act.

Issues framed by the court: (i) whether an occupier can "remedy" a breach of a covenant against anti-social behaviour; (ii) if not, the effect of para 4; alternatively, if an occupier can remedy such a breach, how he may "comply" with a notice to remedy and what is the effect of the obligation to do so "within a reasonable time".

Reasoning and outcome: The court adopted a practical approach drawn from authorities on section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925. It concluded that some breaches of anti-social conduct covenants are remediable because the mischief caused can be redressed (for example by refraining from further misconduct so that transient distress subsides), whereas other breaches may be irremediable because their effects endure (for example where a stigma remains or serious violence has occurred). The court held that a notice to remedy is sensibly required only where a remedy is possible; where a breach is remediable, compliance can occur by not committing further breaches for a reasonable time. On the facts the nearly three-year interval demonstrated compliance for a reasonable time and the 2006 notice could not support termination in 2011. The appeal was allowed.

The court also discussed alternative constructions, noted differing emphases in the judgments about whether a notice is strictly required in all cases, and observed practical steps site owners should take when dealing with potentially irremediable breaches.

Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court concluded that paragraph 4(a) of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 is properly understood as applying, in practice, to breaches capable of remedy; some anti-social breaches are remediable and an occupier may comply with a notice by refraining from further breaches for a reasonable time. On the facts the period of almost three years between the 2006 notice and the later offence meant the occupier had complied for a reasonable time, so termination could not properly be based on that notice.

Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) which on 16 May 2012 dismissed the appellant's appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 635; the first instance decision was an order by HHJ Moloney QC in the Southend County Court dated 17 August 2011 terminating the appellant's licence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on 5 November 2014.