Cruddas v Calvert & Ors

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part. It held that, on a fair reading of the transcript of the undercover meeting of 15 March 2012, the claimant’s statements amounted to saying that large donations would give donors opportunities to influence government policy and obtain commercial advantage through confidential meetings with the Prime Minister and senior ministers; that conduct was inappropriate, unacceptable and wrong, and therefore the defendants were justified in reporting that meaning (meaning 1) for libel purposes. The court rejected the claimant’s contention that the report should be read as imputing criminal corruption under the Bribery Act 2010 for the purposes of libel.

However, the defendants failed to justify two further meanings (meanings 2 and 3) alleging that the claimant countenanced using foreign donations (via conduits or artificial companies) to evade electoral law (PPERA, in particular section 61). The journalists were held liable for libel and malicious falsehood in respect of meanings 2 and 3, and the publisher was liable for those publications.

The Court reduced the overall award to £50,000 (general and aggravated damages) and restricted the injunction to prevent repetition of meanings 2 and 3.

This was an appeal from a trial judge’s finding that three Sunday Times articles about the then Conservative Party Treasurer (Peter Cruddas) were libellous and gave rise to malicious falsehood. The articles recount an undercover meeting at which two journalists, posing as foreign financiers, discussed making large donations to the Conservative Party. The claimant alleged the articles imputed (1) that he corruptly offered for sale the opportunity to influence government policy and obtain unfair advantage through secret meetings with the Prime Minister and senior ministers (meaning 1), (2) that he was prepared to receive donations knowing they would come from Middle Eastern investors via a Liechtenstein fund in breach of electoral law (meaning 2), and (3) that he countenanced evasion of the law by routing foreign donations through artificial UK vehicles or conduits (meaning 3).

The litigation path: claim issued in the Queen’s Bench Division (Mr Justice Tugendhat) where the claimant succeeded on libel and malicious falsehood and was awarded damages; an earlier interlocutory Court of Appeal ruling had fixed the meanings; the defendants appealed the trial judgment to the Court of Appeal ([2015] EWCA Civ 171).

The appeal court considered three principal issues: (i) whether meaning 1 (cash for access) was justified by the transcript for libel purposes; (ii) whether, for malicious falsehood, the defendants were liable if a minority of readers might incorrectly construe the articles as alleging criminal corruption; and (iii) whether meanings 2 and 3 were justified.

The court’s reasoning was as follows: (i) on detailed review of the transcript and the Conservative donors brochure and public statements, the claimant’s description of donor benefits went beyond the brochure and conveyed that "premier league" donors pick up semi-public information and can influence or have enhanced access — conduct the court characterised as inappropriate, unacceptable and wrong; that reading justified meaning 1 for libel. (ii) on malicious falsehood, the court emphasised the subjective test for malice: an author’s foresight that some readers might place an incorrect criminal interpretation on the words does not amount to malice if the author intended the non-criminal (true) meaning. Thus the defendants were not liable in malicious falsehood for the criminal-conduct version of meaning 1. (iii) the defendants could not justify meanings 2 and 3: the transcript showed the claimant insisted on compliance and discussed establishing a real UK operating presence and referring compliance matters to CCHQ staff; the journalists nevertheless published allegations suggesting countenancing of criminal evasion of PPERA s61. The judge’s findings that the journalists acted maliciously in relation to meanings 2 and 3 were upheld.

Relief: the Court allowed the appeal only as to meaning 1 (defendants not liable for libel or malicious falsehood on that meaning), dismissed the appeal on meanings 2 and 3 (defendants liable), reduced damages to £50,000 and varied the injunction so that it applies only to meanings 2 and 3.

The appeal was allowed in part. The Court of Appeal held that meaning 1 (cash for access) was substantially true on the transcript and therefore the defendants were not liable for libel or malicious falsehood in respect of that meaning; but the defendants failed to justify meanings 2 and 3 (alleging countenancing foreign donations to evade PPERA s61) and were liable for libel and malicious falsehood on those meanings. The Court reduced damages to £50,000 and limited the injunction to meanings 2 and 3.

Claim issued in the Queen's Bench Division (Mr Justice Tugendhat) (HQ12D03024); preliminary issues on meaning decided and then trial on liability (judge found for claimant: libel and malicious falsehood; damages awarded). Defendants appealed on multiple grounds. The Court of Appeal ([2015] EWCA Civ 171) heard the appeal and allowed it in part as to meaning 1 but dismissed it as to meanings 2 and 3, reducing damages and modifying the injunction. Earlier interlocutory Court of Appeal ruling on meaning dated 21 June 2013 (Longmore LJ, Rafferty LJ and Sedley LJ) determined meanings that proceeded to trial.