Gopee & Ors v London Mercantile Court

Case-management orders may require litigants connected with related consumer-credit claims to bring or transfer proceedings to one court and to obtain permission before taking enforcement-related steps. Such orders do not necessarily prevent the acquisition or registration of property rights where the affected parties can establish their rights through appropriate proceedings. In assessing justification, the court may consider a documented history of serious breaches of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, vulnerable borrowers and risks of abuse of process. The restrictions remain compatible with fair-hearing and property rights where they are practical and proportionate safeguards. Where the judge who made the orders has retired, allegations of future bias lose practical force. Permission to appeal may be refused where the proposed appeals have no real prospect of success.

Mr Gopee challenged orders made by HHJ Mackie QC in the London Mercantile Court on 19 July 2013 and 29 January 2014. The orders restricted related county court proceedings concerning loans and property, required transfers and disclosure of proceedings, and required permission before further proceedings or related assertions could be made.

Mr Gopee and associated companies sought permission to appeal, an extension of time, joinder of further parties and relief concerning property registration. They alleged bias, denial of a fair trial, unjustified interference with property rights and disregard of consumer-credit legislation. The Court considered the reasons recorded in [2014] EWHC 138 (QB) and the later procedural summary in [2014] EWHC 2679. The central issues were whether the orders were within the court’s case-management powers, whether they unjustifiably restricted the applicants’ rights, and whether the proposed appeals had a real prospect of success.

1. Permission and disposition. Lady Justice Gloster granted an extension of time to challenge the procedural dismissal of the earlier application, but concluded that the proposed appeals had no real prospect of success. Applications for permission to appeal and for joinder were dismissed.
2. Bias. HHJ Mackie had retired and would not hear the future cases. The alleged future bias therefore had no practical basis. The court also found nothing supporting the allegations of past bias.
3. Case management and property rights. The orders did not prevent Mr Gopee or his associated companies from acquiring property or interests such as charges, or from protecting those interests by registration. They required the applicants to issue proceedings so that their entitlement could be examined. If HM Land Registry wrongly objected where no consumer-credit or other objection existed, the applicants could seek the court’s sanction and recover appropriate costs.
4. Proportionality. In light of the serious history of loans made in breach of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the vulnerability of many borrowers and the risk of abuse of process, the orders were a practical and proportionate means of protecting borrowers and managing the related litigation in one forum. They preserved access to appropriate proceedings and did not breach the applicants’ asserted human-rights protections.
5. The applications in all three references, including the application concerning Ghana Commercial Investments Limited and Moneylink Finance Limited, were accordingly dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 28 August 2015, after hearing the applications on 26 March 2015, dismissed the applications for permission to appeal and for joinder.
• Queen’s Bench Division, London Mercantile Court: HHJ Mackie QC made the original order on 19 July 2013 and the extended order on 29 January 2014. Reasons were subsequently given in [2014] EWHC 138 (QB), with a later procedural summary in [2014] EWHC 2679.
• Court of Appeal procedural stage: Longmore LJ had dismissed the initial permission application for failure to comply with an order requiring filing of the lower court material. The Court of Appeal later extended time to challenge that dismissal.