Gopee & Ors v London Mercantile Court

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal against the orders of HHJ Mackie QC (the 19 July 2013 order and the extended order of 29 January 2014). The appeal court held that HHJ Mackie had acted within his case management powers and inherent jurisdiction to transfer and control litigation brought by companies and persons associated with Mr Gopee, to protect vulnerable defendants, to require disclosure of pending county-court proceedings and to impose procedural constraints on further steps without the Mercantile Court's leave.

The court concluded there was no real prospect of success on appeal: alleged bias was not a present problem (the judge had retired), the orders did not prevent the companies from acquiring or protecting property but sensibly required judicial sanction in light of concerns about unlicensed consumer credit enforcement and potentially defective assignments, and the measures were proportionate to prevent abuse of process.

Background and parties: The appellant, Mr Dharam Prakash Gopee, and a number of companies associated with him were subject to case-management orders made by HHJ Mackie QC in the London Mercantile Court concerning litigation arising from loans made by the 'Barons' companies. The Mercantile Court had made a series of orders (19 July 2013 and an extended order 29 January 2014) restricting the commencement and conduct of county-court proceedings by Mr Gopee and related companies, requiring lodgement of a comprehensive list of such proceedings, and imposing procedural requirements for any application to vary or discharge the orders.

The applications and procedural posture (nature of relief sought):

• Mr Gopee sought permission to appeal the 19 July 2013 order and, later, to appeal the extended order of 29 January 2014. He also applied to set aside an order of Longmore LJ requiring lodgement of a transcript and sought various ancillary reliefs (stay of execution, permission to amend grounds, joinder of additional parties, and to proceed with enforcement/registration steps at HM Land Registry).
• Applications to the Court of Appeal included challenges that HHJ Mackie had acted beyond jurisdiction, had been biased and had breached rights under the Human Rights Act 1998; that the orders prevented acquisition and protection of property interests; and that the court had improperly managed and reopened concluded matters.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the Mercantile Court had power to make the orders it did as an exercise of case management and inherent jurisdiction and whether those orders were proportionate.
• Whether the claimants (companies associated with Mr Gopee) had been deprived of property rights or a fair trial by the requirement to obtain court approval before registration or enforcement steps.
• Allegations of judicial bias or predetermination and whether those complaints gave any prospect of success on appeal.

Court's reasoning and subsidiary findings:

• The Court of Appeal reviewed HHJ Mackie's detailed findings (including judgments at [2014] EWHC 138 (QB) and [2014] EWHC 2679) about repeated procedural abuses, questionable assignments, potential unlicensed consumer-credit activity, and the vulnerability of defendants. Those findings provided a factual foundation for the remedial case-management orders.
• The orders were aimed at concentrating related litigation in one forum to protect defendants and to enable the court and regulators (for example the Insolvency Service and the OFT/FCA) to address systemic concerns. The measures required companies to demonstrate title or entitlement before they could proceed to register or enforce property rights; this was a case-management response to an established pattern of conduct and not an absolute bar to acquiring or protecting property.
• Bias complaints were dismissed on the basis that HHJ Mackie had retired and future proceedings would be dealt with by other judges; past case-management consistency did not equate to bias. The court found no realistic prospect that the Human Rights Act arguments or the challenge based on traditional finality principles (such as Henderson v Henderson) would succeed.
• Procedural default by the appellant (for example failure to lodge required transcripts and late filing) also undermined the applications for permission to appeal.

Disposition: The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications for permission to appeal and related joinder applications for the reasons above, concluding that there was no real prospect of success.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications for permission to appeal. It held that HHJ Mackie had been entitled to exercise case-management and inherent jurisdiction to make the 19 July 2013 and 29 January 2014 orders to protect vulnerable defendants and to control litigation arising from the Barons companies. The orders were a proportionate response to the judge's findings of procedural abuse, questionable assignments and potential unlicensed consumer-credit enforcement; allegations of bias and of unlawful deprivation of property had no real prospect of success, and the appellant had not complied with procedural requirements for lodging transcripts.

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the Queen's Bench Division, London Mercantile Court (HHJ Mackie QC). HHJ Mackie made the principal orders on 19 July 2013 and an extended order on 29 January 2014; he gave extended reasoning in judgments under neutral citations [2014] EWHC 138 (QB) and [2014] EWHC 2679. An order of Longmore LJ dated 28 January 2014 required lodgement of a transcript and skeleton argument; Mr Gopee failed to comply and his earlier application for permission to appeal stood dismissed. The Court of Appeal heard the consolidated applications on 26 March 2015 and delivered judgment on 28 August 2015 refusing permission to appeal and dismissing related joinder applications.