Cash v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

In a planning challenge engaging Article 8, a child’s best interests must be treated as a primary consideration. That status is an important starting point, not a fixed outcome. After identifying and evaluating the child’s individual interests, other considerations may equal or exceed them in weight.

An inspector may conduct a structured, household-by-household proportionality assessment. The decision must be read as a whole, and need not repeat the same analysis when considering temporary permission. On a section 288 challenge, the court undertakes judicial review with appropriate scrutiny, but gives substantial respect to the expert decision-maker’s planning judgment and margin of discretion.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s dismissal of his appeal against refusal of planning permission for the stationing of 22 mobile homes. Existing enforcement notices required removal of the mobile homes and associated works. The site housed vulnerable families, including 23 children.

The challenge alleged failure to treat the children’s best interests as a primary consideration, irrationality, and errors in the inspector’s assessment of proportionality under Article 8. The claimant also argued that temporary planning permission should have been granted to allow residents to secure alternative accommodation.

1. The application was dismissed. The inspector had not erred in law, acted irrationally, or failed to conduct the required proportionality assessment.
2. The best interests of children are a primary consideration in planning decisions engaging Article 8. They are not paramount, and no other consideration is inherently more important. Their weight must be assessed after examining the individual circumstances. Other considerations may equal or exceed them in the particular case.
3. The inspector’s approach was lawful. She identified the importance of the children’s interests, considered the effect on each household, examined alternative accommodation and other relevant factors, and carried out a structured proportionality assessment. Her reasons were clear and adequate.
4. The assessment was one of substance rather than form. The decision letter had to be read as a whole. The inspector was not required to repeat the full permanent-permission analysis when considering temporary permission. Her conclusion that temporary permission would not overcome the serious conflict with planning policy and environmental objectives was open to her.
5. On a section 288 challenge where Article 8 is engaged, the court conducts traditional judicial review together with appropriate consideration of proportionality. It does not undertake a full merits review. An experienced planning inspector in an area of social policy has a wide margin of discretion, and considerable deference is appropriate.
6. The planning harm identified by the inspector, including landscape, visual, biodiversity and policy objections, provided a rational basis for refusing permission. The application was therefore dismissed.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The application challenging the inspector’s decision was dismissed.