Taylor, R v Secretary of State for Justice & Ors

Section 2 of the Offender Management Act 2007 imposes a general responsibility to ensure sufficient probation provision, not a duty to provide particular assistance to an individual offender. Where funding serves both social-care and rehabilitation purposes, the cooperation duty in section 6(1) of the Care Act 2014 requires good-faith discussions about an appropriate funding arrangement, but it does not require a relevant partner to fund services outside its statutory function. Claims of discrimination require proof of the statutory disadvantage or less favourable treatment. The evidence did not establish indirect discrimination, a failure to make reasonable adjustments, or breach of the public sector equality duty.

The claimant, aged 77 and disabled, had served more than 40 years for murder. The Parole Board directed his release to Ashdene, subject to funding for his adult-care needs. No organisation agreed to pay the additional weekly cost, and his release did not occur.

Permission for judicial review was granted on alleged breaches of statutory and public-law resettlement duties and discrimination arising from age and disability. The court considered whether the defendants were required to fund or arrange the necessary support, whether they had failed to cooperate with Wakefield Council, and whether the arrangements for supervised accommodation unlawfully discriminated against older or disabled prisoners.

1. Claim dismissed. The defendants had not breached any duty causing the claimant’s continued detention.
2. Section 2 of the Offender Management Act 2007 concerns the overall sufficiency of probation provision throughout England and Wales. It does not require specific provision for a particular offender. The Secretary of State is entitled to determine what provision is sufficient, subject to ordinary judicial-review principles. Section 2(5) does not enlarge that duty or require the Secretary of State to fund care which another body does not provide.
3. The additional support proposed at Ashdene had dual purposes. Some assistance related to disability-related social care; other assistance could properly be characterised as rehabilitation or supervision. Section 6(1) of the Care Act 2014 is intended to prevent an individual falling between institutional responsibilities. Where support arguably serves both social-care and rehabilitation purposes, the defendants must engage in good-faith discussions with the local authority and be ready and willing to contribute financially to an appropriate arrangement for a priority need. That duty was not breached because Wakefield Council repeatedly assessed the claimant as ineligible for funding.
4. The reasoning in R (Haney) v Secretary of State for Justice did not establish a duty under article 5 ECHR to provide supervised community accommodation after a prisoner’s risk had become manageable in the community. The issue was procedurally unavailable in any event and the court declined to decide whether such an extension should be recognised.
5. Direct discrimination was not established because no decision had been shown in which the claimant was treated less favourably because of disability. Indirect discrimination was not established because the evidence did not show a particular disadvantage. In any event, requiring offenders posing a significant risk to reside at approved premises was a proportionate means of achieving legitimate aims, including public protection and rehabilitation.
6. The evidence did not establish a substantial disadvantage triggering the reasonable-adjustments duty, or a failure to have due regard under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The application for permission to appeal was also dismissed. Costs were ordered against the claimant, subject to the stated legal-aid limitations.

First-instance judicial review. Permission to appeal was dismissed by the High Court.