Davy v Pickering & Ors
[2015] EWHC 380 (Ch)
Case details
Case summary
The judge granted two consequential directions under section 1032(3) of the Companies Act 2006 when restoring a dissolved company: (i) a limitation direction that the period between striking off and restoration should not count for the purposes of any enactment governing time limits, and (ii) a petition direction deeming a winding-up petition presented at the time of dissolution if presented within a short period after the order. The court treated the power in section 1032(3) as wide but limited by the statutory purpose of placing parties "in the same position (as nearly as may be) as if the company had not been dissolved or struck off the register". The directions were justified by the claimant's plausible, arguable claim for damages, the effect of the respondents' conduct in procuring dissolution without giving statutorily required notice to a potential creditor, and the loss of a short window in which insolvency procedures might have been effective (including transaction-avoidance remedies in the Insolvency Act 1986). The judge noted unresolved issues of limitation (date of knowledge under section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980) and of whether, if presented, a winding-up petition would succeed and enable recovery under sections 238 and 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
Case abstract
Background and procedural posture. The company Heather Moor & Edgecomb Limited was struck off the register on 20 March 2012. The claimant, Mr Graham Davy, applied under Part 31 of the Companies Act 2006 for restoration (a District Judge ordered restoration on 1 July 2014) and sought directions under section 1032(3) consequential on restoration. The claimant asserted a substantial negligent-misadvice claim against the company arising from advice given in 2001 and relied on a date of relevant knowledge of 19 July 2011 for limitation purposes. After restoration the parties agreed a stand-still and the claimant issued proceedings; he nonetheless sought a direction that the period of dissolution should not count for limitation and a direction deeming a winding-up petition to have been presented on 20 March 2012 if presented within 14 days.
Parties and factual matrix. The company had been run by Mr and Mrs Pickering, who together disposed of the business and transferred real property in mid-2010, shortly before Mr Pickering resigned as a director. No run-off insurance was arranged and the claimant asserts that assets were distributed to the Pickering shareholders within two years of dissolution when they had reason to foresee claims such as his might arise. The Financial Ombudsman Service and Financial Services Compensation Scheme were involved and the FSCS made and the claimant accepted a capped compensation payment, with subsequent reassignment of rights to the claimant.
Relief sought and issues framed. (i) The Limitation Direction: that the period between striking off and restoration be disregarded for all enactments, including the Limitation Act 1980; (ii) The Petition Direction: deeming a winding-up petition to be presented at the date of dissolution if presented within 14 days of the directions order. The court had to decide whether to exercise the wide discretion in section 1032(3) to give those directions and whether the circumstances justified overriding the ordinary limitation regime.
Court’s reasoning. The judge reviewed authorities illustrating that limitation directions are permissible where justice so requires, but are not routine. He emphasised that section 1032(3) must be used to place parties "in the same position (as nearly as may be)" as if the company had not been dissolved. Although attention was paid to dicta suggesting limitation directions should be sparingly used, the judge found those dicta did not impose a closed test of "exceptional circumstances" and that the facts here (directors procuring dissolution without giving creditor notice, loss of a practical window to present a petition and to benefit from transaction-avoidance provisions) justified the directions. The judge did not finally determine whether the claimant’s substantive claim would survive a limitation challenge or whether a liquidator could recover under the transaction-avoidance provisions; those remain matters for subsequent proceedings.
Held
Cited cases
- R (Heather Moor & Edgecomb Limited) v Financial Ombudsman Service, [2008] EWCA Civ 642 neutral
- Tyman's Ltd v Craven, [1952] 2 QB 100 positive
- Re Donald Kenyon Ltd, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1397 positive
- Re Huntingdon Poultry Ltd, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 204 positive
- Re Lindsay Bowman Limited, [1969] 3 All ER 601 positive
- Re Forte’s (Manufacturing) Ltd, [1994] B.C.C. 84 neutral
- Regent Leisuretime Limited v NatWest Finance Limited, [2003] BCC 587 mixed
- Jodrell v Peaktone Ltd, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 784 positive
Legislation cited
- Companies Act 1948: section 353(6)
- Companies Act 1985: Section 651
- Companies Act 1985: Section 653
- Companies Act 2006: Part 31
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1003
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1006
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1011
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1029
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1030
- Companies Act 2006: section 1031(1)(c)
- Companies Act 2006: Section 1032
- Companies Act 2006: Section 994-996 – ss.994-996
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 238
- Insolvency Act 1986: Section 239
- Limitation Act 1980: Section 14A