Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State unlawfully suspended payment of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) to Cameron after his 84th day as an NHS in‑patient because the suspension amounted to unjustified discrimination contrary to article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken with Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1). The court treated Cameron as having a protected status as a severely disabled child requiring lengthy in‑patient treatment and found that the 84‑day rule was not justified on the evidence in his case.

The court considered the statutory framework for DLA (notably sections 71–76 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and the Social Security (Disability Living Allowance) Regulations 1991, especially regs 8 and 10) and the purpose of the overlapping‑benefits rules. It applied the established article 14 justification test (legitimate aim and reasonable relationship of proportionality, bearing in mind the margin of appreciation) and concluded the Secretary of State had not shown adequate justification or that the decision-making process had taken account of the best interests of disabled children as required by international instruments. The court therefore allowed the appeal and ordered that the First‑tier Tribunal should have allowed Cameron’s appeal and declared his entitlement to continued payment of DLA from 6 October 2010 until reinstatement.

The appellant was a severely disabled child who remained as an NHS hospital in‑patient at Alder Hey for a continuous period exceeding 84 days. The Secretary of State suspended payment of Cameron’s DLA from 6 October 2010 on the ground that the 84‑day threshold in regulation 10 of the Social Security (Disability Living Allowance) Regulations 1991 had been exceeded. The family relied on DLA as a significant element of household income and evidence indicated parental care and expense continued (and in some respects increased) while the child was an in‑patient.

Procedural history:

• First‑tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support) dismissed the appeal (10 January 2012).
• Upper Tribunal set aside the First‑tier Tribunal for an error of law but dismissed the appeal on the merits (15 January 2013).
• Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal ([2014] EWCA Civ 286; judgment 5 February 2014).
• Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was pursued and judgment given 8 July 2015.

Nature of the claim and relief sought: The appellant sought a determination that the suspension of DLA violated his Convention rights under article 14 taken with A1P1 (and alternatively article 8), and consequential relief that the suspension decision be set aside and continued payment ordered.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the suspension of DLA after 84 days was within the scope (ambit) of A1P1 (and optionally article 8).
• Whether the differential treatment constituted discrimination on a prohibited ground ("other status") under article 14.
• Whether any difference of treatment was justified (legitimate aim and proportionality) having regard to domestic margin of appreciation and relevant international obligations, including the child’s best interests.
• What remedy was appropriate in the individual case.

Court’s reasoning: The court accepted that DLA falls within the scope of A1P1. It held that Cameron had a relevant status as a severely disabled child who required prolonged in‑patient care. Applying the article 14 justification test, the court examined the Secretary of State’s explanation for the 84‑day suspension (overlap avoidance and administrative bright‑line rules) and evidence about parental involvement and costs while the child was hospitalised. The court found the Secretary of State had not demonstrated an objective and reasonable justification in Cameron’s case, had not undertaken an assessment of the impact on disabled children as required by the UN child‑rights instruments, and had not shown that the bright‑line rule was proportionate in these circumstances. The Supreme Court therefore allowed the appeal in respect of Cameron’s individual entitlement and directed that the First‑tier Tribunal should have allowed the appeal and ordered continued payment from 6 October 2010.

The court declined to read the regulations so as to remove the 84‑day rule generally, emphasising the individual character of human‑rights remedies and allowing the Secretary of State opportunity to consider adjustments in policy or criteria to avoid similar breaches.

Appeal allowed. The Secretary of State’s decision to suspend Cameron’s DLA after his 84th day as an NHS in‑patient violated article 14 taken with Article 1 of Protocol 1 because the differential treatment of a severely disabled child in prolonged hospital care was not shown to be objectively and reasonably justified. Consequently, the First‑tier Tribunal should have allowed the appeal, set aside the suspension decision and substituted a decision entitling Cameron to continued DLA from 6 October 2010 until reinstatement.

First‑tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support) dismissed the appeal on 10 January 2012. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) set aside the First‑tier Tribunal for error of law but dismissed the appeal on 15 January 2013. Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s further appeal ([2014] EWCA Civ 286) on 5 February 2014. Appeal to the Supreme Court allowed on 8 July 2015 ([2015] UKSC 47).