P v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

Judicial immunity protects members of a police disciplinary panel from discrimination claims challenging the panel’s conduct in exercising its judicial function, including the process by which its decision was reached. The immunity is not confined to defamation or to statements made by the panel. A claim alleging that the panel’s disciplinary decision and reasoning constituted unlawful discrimination directly impugns the integrity of the judicial body and is barred. Lake v British Transport Police did not qualify that rule: it concerned whether an effective dismissing officer was bound by a panel’s findings. The Court of Appeal remained bound by Heath v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police.

A serving police officer developed post-traumatic stress disorder after an assault. Following an incident involving alcohol, she was charged with misconduct and dismissed by a police misconduct panel. She brought disability discrimination claims under the Equality Act 2010, alleging discrimination arising from disability, failure to make reasonable adjustments and harassment.

The Employment Tribunal struck out the claims because they impugned the decision and process of a judicial body protected by immunity from suit. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld that decision. The appeal concerned whether Heath v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police was inconsistent with Lake v British Transport Police, and whether the panel’s immunity prevented the claims from proceeding.

1. Appeal dismissed. The police misconduct panel was a judicial body acting judicially. Its members therefore had immunity from suit in respect of the disability discrimination claims.
2. Under Heath v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [2005] ICR 329, the immunity is not restricted to defamatory statements. It extends to acts of unlawful discrimination committed in the course of judicial proceedings. Whether a body is judicial is determined by an overall impression, having regard to matters including legal recognition, the similarity of the issue and procedure to civil or criminal proceedings, and whether the process produces a binding determination of civil rights. No single factor is decisive.
3. The appellant’s case did more than challenge the correctness of the dismissal. It alleged that disciplining and dismissing her, the process by which the panel reached its decision, and the resolution of the proceedings were themselves discriminatory. That directly challenged the panel’s exercise of its judicial function and fell within the immunity recognised in Heath.
4. Lake v British Transport Police [2007] ICR 1293 was not inconsistent with Heath. It concerned only whether an effective dismissing officer was bound by a disciplinary panel’s findings in a statutory whistleblowing claim. It did not permit a claim against panel members based on their conduct or decision.
5. There was no recognised exception to stare decisis. Heath was not decided per incuriam, and the later decisions referred to did not affect its authority. The court was accordingly bound by Heath and could not distinguish it.
6. The statutory availability of discrimination claims for police officers did not remove the common-law immunity of a disciplinary panel exercising a judicial function.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. Laws LJ held that the police misconduct panel was protected by judicial immunity; Lewison LJ and Christopher Clarke LJ agreed.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Langstaff J dismissed the appeal on 25 March 2014.
• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Etherington struck out the disability discrimination claim on 8 July 2013.