Hopkins, R (on the application of) v Sodexo / HMP Bronzefield & Ors

A prison policy may lawfully adopt an inflexible rule where permitting exceptions would undermine an important statutory aim underlying the relevant power. The rule against intimate partners sharing a cell was justified by the requirements of order and discipline, and was applied after consideration of the claimant’s care needs.

The separation of serving prisoners into adjoining cells, while preserving substantial daily contact, did not engage or breach Articles 3 or 8 of the ECHR. Alternatively, any interference with Article 8 was lawful and proportionate. The prison had also taken reasonable steps under sections 20 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

The claimant, a disabled prisoner at HMP Bronzefield, challenged the decision to prevent her civil partner and fellow prisoner from continuing to share her cell. The decision was made under the prison’s Decency/Managing Relationships Policy, which stated that women in an intimate relationship were not to share a cell.

She argued that the restriction was unauthorised because it had not been made by statutory instrument, unlawfully fettered discretion, and breached Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR and duties under the Equality Act 2010. The defendants relied on prison order and discipline, the care assessment undertaken, and the continuing daily contact between the prisoners. The central questions concerned the enforceability and application of the restriction and the alleged human-rights and equality-law breaches.

1. Disposition. The application was dismissed.
2. The intimate relationship restriction was enforceable. Rule 6(1) of the Prison Rules 1999, made under the Prison Act 1952, required order and discipline to be maintained. The restriction was directed to that statutory aim and did not require separate inclusion in a statutory instrument.
3. The general rule against fettering discretion did not invalidate the restriction. Following Nicholds and Sayaniya, an inflexible policy may be lawful where exceptions would substantially undermine an important legislative aim. In any event, the claimant’s care needs had been considered through occupational-therapy evidence, medical referrals, multidisciplinary meetings and consultation with her GP.
4. The Article 3 claim failed. The claimant had not established treatment reaching the minimum level of seriousness required for degrading treatment. The evidence showed that the prison had investigated and addressed her health needs, and that she retained the ability to transfer to and use the toilet.
5. The Article 8 claim also failed. A custodial sentence necessarily curtails a prisoner’s freedom to choose associates and living arrangements. The claimant and her partner remained on the same wing, in adjoining cells, with substantial and unfettered daily contact. There was no right to insist on a particular cellmate.
6. Alternatively, any Article 8 interference was justified under Article 8(2). The restriction was in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder through good prison discipline, and was proportionate. The decision-making process also gave sufficient regard to the claimant’s interests.
7. The claimant was disabled within section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, but the section 20 claim failed. The prison had taken reasonable steps to avoid any substantial disadvantage, including providing adapted accommodation, equipment, medical assessment and further healthcare assessment.
8. The section 149(1) claim failed because the prison had due regard to the claimant’s disability before separating the prisoners.