London Borough of Hackney v Haque

Where a disabled homeless applicant challenges the suitability of accommodation, the public sector equality duty requires a sharp, fact-specific focus on the applicant’s impairments, the resulting disadvantages and needs, and whether the accommodation meets those needs. The duty is substantive. It does not prescribe a formula, a particular weight, or accommodation exceeding what is suitable.

A review decision must give reasons appropriate to its context, but it need not expressly identify each stage of the equality analysis. Read fairly and in context, it is sufficient if the decision demonstrates rigorous and open-minded consideration of the relevant disability-related needs alongside all other suitability considerations.

The respondent was homeless and owed the full housing duty under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. The appellant council accommodated him in a third-floor hostel room. He sought a review of its suitability, relying on chronic physical pain, depression, the room’s size, a no-visitors policy and the absence of on-site laundry facilities.

The reviewing officer decided that the room was suitable. On an appeal to the Central London County Court, HHJ Luba QC quashed that decision. The judge considered that the written review did not sufficiently demonstrate compliance with the public sector equality duty.

The council appealed. The central issue was whether the review decision, read as a whole and in its context, showed substantive compliance with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

1. Appeal allowed. The review decision that Room 315 was suitable was reinstated.

2. The judge had erred by imposing an almost universal requirement for a reviewing officer to state expressly whether the applicant had a protected characteristic, whether the public sector equality duty applied, and its precise effect. The guidance in Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council; Kanu v Southwark London Borough Council [2016] AC 811 had to be read in the setting of a vulnerability assessment. Its general lesson was that the decision maker must focus sharply on the relevant equality considerations arising on the facts.

3. For this suitability review, section 149 required the officer to recognise that the applicant was disabled; identify the relevant impairments; consider the resulting disadvantages and particular accommodation needs; consider whether disability required more favourable treatment; and review suitability with due regard to those matters. It did not require accommodation better than suitable, nor acceptance of the applicant’s assertions without scrutiny. The officer was entitled to obtain and assess medical evidence, and had to consider other statutory and guidance-based suitability factors as well.

4. Section 149 creates no independent duty to give reasons. Section 203(4)(a) of the Housing Act 1996 required reasons sufficient for the applicant to understand the adverse review and assess whether statutory duties had been met. The necessary standard depends on the circumstances.

5. On a fair stand-back reading, the decision identified the applicant’s physical and mental impairments, examined their alleged effects on his use of the room, and considered measures addressing space, access, social contact and laundry. Its conclusions were stringent, but did not show an absence of good faith, rigour or due regard. Scarce housing resources may require difficult decisions without establishing a breach of the equality duty.

McCombe LJ added that specific written consideration of the relevant equality features may usefully demonstrate compliance and avoid litigation, although it must not become a tick-box exercise.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Allowed the council’s appeal and reinstated the reviewing officer’s decision that the accommodation was suitable.

• Central London County Court. HHJ Luba QC quashed the reviewing officer’s decision on 18 February 2016, finding that it did not adequately demonstrate compliance with the public sector equality duty.