Hamnett v Essex County Council

A claim that an experimental traffic regulation order contravenes section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 must be brought in the County Court under Part 9 of that Act. A statutory-review procedure in the High Court under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 cannot be used for that claim.

The conflicting jurisdictional provisions were incapable of standing together. The later, discrimination-specific County Court jurisdiction therefore impliedly repealed the earlier High Court procedure and ouster provision only to the necessary extent. A statutory review is a proceeding within section 113(1), but is not a claim for judicial review within section 113(3). Claims based on the public sector equality duty remain within the High Court's jurisdiction.

The appellant, a disabled person, challenged two experimental traffic regulation orders affecting disabled parking in Colchester. She sought statutory review in the High Court under Part VI of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Her challenge alleged, among other matters, discrimination and a failure to make reasonable adjustments contrary to section 29 of the Equality Act 2010.

Singh J dismissed the application: Hamnett v Essex County Council [2014] EWHC 246 (Admin). He held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction over the section 29 complaint, which belonged in the County Court. By the appeal hearing the orders had expired. The central issues were the proper forum for the section 29 claim and whether the appeal should be entertained despite being academic.

1. Appeal dismissed. Gross LJ, with whom King and Tomlinson LJJ agreed, upheld Singh J’s conclusion that the County Court, rather than the High Court, had jurisdiction over the appellant’s section 29 complaint.

2. Part VI of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 would, considered alone, require a challenge to the validity of an experimental traffic regulation order to be brought in the High Court. Such a challenge could include non-compliance with other primary legislation. Conversely, Part 9 of the Equality Act 2010 requires proceedings relating to a contravention of that Act to be brought in accordance with that Part, which confers jurisdiction on the County Court.

3. A statutory-review application is a proceeding for section 113(1). It is not a claim for judicial review within section 113(3). The latter expression has its strict procedural meaning and does not include a statutory review pursued as of right without permission.

4. The two jurisdictional regimes were irreconcilable. Applying the doctrine of implied repeal, the later provisions in Part 9 of the Equality Act 2010 prevailed. Schedule 9, including its ouster provision, was impliedly repealed only so far as necessary to permit a section 29 claim concerning an experimental traffic regulation order to proceed in the County Court. That court could grant the judicial-review remedies authorised by section 119(2)(b).

5. The court also concluded that the appeal had become academic when the orders expired. Although a court has a narrow discretion to hear an academic public-law appeal, there was no evidence that numerous similar cases required prompt resolution and no clear evidence of costs sufficient to justify the further expense. The court’s having heard the jurisdiction issue de bene esse was not encouragement to pursue academic appeals.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the conclusion that the County Court had jurisdiction over the section 29 complaint.

• High Court, Administrative Court: Singh J dismissed the statutory-review application: [2014] EWHC 246 (Admin).