Edward v Royal Borough of Greenwich

Permission to commence contempt proceedings based on an allegedly false statement should be granted only where there is a strong prima facie case, the proceedings serve the public interest, and they are proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective.

A statement of truth in pleadings applies sensibly to statements of fact, not to legal submissions. Contempt proceedings should not become a collateral means of challenging legal arguments already advanced in judicial review proceedings, particularly where the underlying claim has been found unarguable and the alleged statements are neither false nor deliberately misleading.

The applicant sought permission to bring committal proceedings against the respondent’s solicitor and housing allocation manager. He alleged that three passages in the respondent’s summary grounds of defence to his judicial review claim contained knowingly false or deliberately misleading statements.

The underlying judicial review challenged the suspension and exclusion of the applicant from the respondent’s housing register. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused by HH Judge Wall QC, and permission to appeal was refused by Gloster LJ, who considered the decision plainly correct and the proposed appeal totally without merit.

The central issues were whether the challenged passages contained false or misleading statements and whether contempt proceedings were justified under CPR Part 81.

1. Permission refused. The applicant failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the challenged passages contained false or deliberately misleading statements. There was also no public interest in commencing contempt proceedings.
2. Under CPR Part 81, permission requires more than an arguable complaint. The applicant must show a strong prima facie case, and the court must consider the public interest, proportionality, likely cost, court resources and the overriding objective. The court must take care not to prejudice the merits of any later contempt hearing.
3. The challenged paragraphs formed part of counsel’s legal submissions in the summary grounds of defence. They were not equivalent to a witness statement or affidavit by a person with personal knowledge of the facts. The statement of truth could sensibly apply to factual assertions, but not to legal submissions.
4. The respondent’s account that Ms Sewell had overlooked the extent and seriousness of the applicant’s convictions was supported by her evidence and was not shown to be false or misleading. The fact that the respondent possessed information about both convictions did not establish that she had appreciated their full significance when the earlier email was sent.
5. The statements concerning the reasons under consideration for suspending the housing application were also neither false nor misleading. The exclusion decision did not take legal effect until it was notified, and the applicant remained able to make representations. The underlying judicial review proceedings had already provided the appropriate route for challenging the respondent’s decisions.
6. In light of the reasoned refusal of judicial review permission by HH Judge Wall QC, confirmed by Gloster LJ, the proposed committal proceedings would serve no public interest. The application was therefore refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of £3,920 plus VAT within 28 days.

• Administrative Court: HH Judge Wall QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused permission to apply for judicial review in claim CO/5374/2016.
• Court of Appeal: Gloster LJ refused permission to appeal, holding that the decision below was plainly correct and that the proposed appeal was totally without merit.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The committal-permission application was refused. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.