QUB v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention remains subject to a presumption in favour of temporary admission or release. The decision-maker must consider all relevant factors under the applicable detention policy, including mental illness and any history of torture. A reported mental-health condition engages the policy’s consideration requirement, but does not itself establish that detention is permitted only in very exceptional circumstances. The relevant question is whether the condition is serious and cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention. A person who has evaded immigration control for a prolonged period may rationally be assessed as an abscond risk, even without previously breaching imposed conditions. The public sector equality duty requires due regard to relevant equality impacts, but does not require a particular outcome and does not itself confer a private-law claim for damages.

The claimant, an Indian national, sought judicial review of his detention from 9 February to 29 March 2016. He challenged the application of the immigration detention policy, the assessment that he presented a high risk of absconding, and compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

He had reported depression, poor memory, anxiety, flashbacks and nightmares, and later produced independent evidence of torture. The permission granted for judicial review was limited to whether very exceptional circumstances precluded detention, whether there was a rational basis for the abscond-risk assessment, and whether the equality duty had been discharged.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. Paragraph 55.10 of Chapter 55 of the Enforcement Instruction Guidance was not engaged. The evidence did not establish that the claimant suffered from a serious mental disorder which could not be satisfactorily managed in detention. The court considered all available material, including information not known when detention began. The claimant’s reported depression, poor memory, anxiety, flashbacks and nightmares did not, without more, satisfy that threshold. The Rule 35 report did not state that continued detention was likely to injure his health.
2. Paragraph 55.3 was engaged. The decision-maker had taken account of the claimant’s reported mental health and history of torture. The reviewing officer had conducted the screening interview, the asylum claim was addressed, and the absence of healthcare information indicating unsuitability for detention was noted. The policy was therefore correctly applied.
3. Grounds 2 and 3 dismissed. The conclusion that the claimant was a high abscond risk was rational. He had remained outside immigration control for about five years, had not claimed asylum until after arrest, and had no identified family ties or dependants in the United Kingdom. A person who has evaded immigration control may rationally be regarded as presenting at least as significant a risk as a person who has previously breached imposed conditions.
4. Ground 4 dismissed. The section 149 duty under the Equality Act 2010 required due regard to equality impacts, not achievement of a particular result. The claimant identified no disadvantage or prejudice caused by the alleged breach. The evidence showed that appropriate training was provided and disclosed no deficiency in the assessment of his vulnerabilities. A breach of section 149 did not confer a private-law cause of action or entitlement to damages under sections 113, 114, 119 and 156.
5. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The judgment records that permission was granted on 22 November 2016 and extended after an oral hearing on 31 March 2017. The claim was dismissed.