Jewish Rights Watch Ltd (t/a Jewish Human Rights Watch), R (On the Application Of) v Leicester City Council

The public sector equality duty applies whenever a public authority exercises a function, including when elected councillors pass a symbolic political resolution having no direct practical effect. The resolution's practical significance may nevertheless affect the degree of consideration required.

The authority must address the statutory equality needs in substance, with rigour and an open mind. It need not refer expressly to the duty, although doing so is good practice. For a multi-member body, compliance may be inferred from the material before it, the resolution's terms and the recorded debate. The court determines whether there was a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria. The weight assigned to equality considerations remains for the decision-maker.

Jewish Rights Watch Ltd sought judicial review of Leicester City Council's resolution calling, so far as legally permissible, for a boycott of produce from Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It alleged that the Council had failed to consider sufficiently the resolution's possible effect upon Jewish people and community relations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the claim in [2016] EWHC 1512 (Admin), holding that the Council had breached neither section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 nor section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988. The appellant appealed only the ruling concerning section 149.

The central issue was whether the assembly of elected councillors had due regard, in substance, to eliminating discrimination and harassment and fostering good relations between Jewish people and others when adopting the resolution.

1. Appeal dismissed. The public sector equality duty in section 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 applied when the councillors passed the resolution. Passing it was an exercise of a Council function. Its symbolic character and lack of practical effect did not exclude the duty, although those matters could affect the extent of consideration required.

2. The duty requires due regard to the statutory equality needs, not achievement of a particular result. Its weight and extent are fact-sensitive. A decision-maker need not refer expressly to the duty if it is addressed in substance, although an express reminder is good practice. The court asks whether there was rigorous consideration and a proper and conscientious focus upon the statutory criteria. The weight ultimately assigned to those matters belongs to the decision-maker.

3. The political setting did not render the duty inapplicable or impermissibly restrict councillors' freedom of political expression. Individual councillors remained free to express their political opinions. The Council, acting through the assembly as a whole, was nevertheless required to comply with section 149(1).

4. Compliance by a multi-member body may be assessed through ordinary evidential methods. Statements from every member are unnecessary. Inferences may be drawn from the information placed before the body, the terms of the resolution or report, and the minutes or transcript of debate. Elected councillors may also be expected to understand community relations in their area.

5. The Council complied with the duty. The amended resolution expressly promoted good community relationships, harmony and respect. Its preamble emphasised tolerance, diversity, unity and non-discrimination. The debate addressed the Jewish community, the danger of the resolution being misconstrued and the importance of maintaining harmonious relations. The criticism of Israeli governmental action was temperate and did not, in its context, indicate antisemitism or incitement.

6. The councillors therefore had due regard in substance to eliminating discrimination and harassment and fostering good relations. How much weight those considerations should receive was a matter for their political judgment. The respondent's notice raising delay and standing consequently required no determination.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2018] EWCA Civ 1551 , unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the conclusion that the Council complied with its public sector equality duty. The respondent's notice concerning delay and standing was not determined.

2. High Court, Administrative Court sitting as a Divisional Court: In [2016] EWHC 1512 (Admin) , dismissed the judicial review claim, holding that the Council had breached neither section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 nor section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988.