Boskovic, R (On the Application Of) v Chief Constable of Staffordshire Police

The claim concerned a challenge to the defendant police authority's refusal to give "agreement" under regulation 32(2) of the Police (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006 to refer a prior medical authority decision back for reconsideration. The court treated the purposive interpretation of regulation 32(2) adopted in R (Crudace) and R (Haworth) as the correct approach for present purposes: regulation 32(2) exists, at least in part, to correct mistakes of fact or law so that a former officer receives the pension to which she is entitled. However the court held that a decision-maker may permissibly take account of delay and the practical consequences of delay (including unavailability of original medical witnesses and the public cost of an unfair process) provided the statutory purpose is not frustrated. The Chief Constable's decision was therefore lawful because the 14 year delay, the unavailability of the principal medical witnesses and the resulting risk that no fair reconsideration could occur were properly and rationally weighed against the claimant's less than "clear cut" causation case.

Background and nature of claim: The claimant, a former police officer medically retired in 2002, sought judicial review of the Chief Constable's refusal to agree under regulation 32(2) of the Police (Injury Benefit) Regulations 2006 to refer the question of causation back to a medical authority for reconsideration. The claimant alleged that the refusal was unlawful for inadequate reasons and for failure to address the primary statutory purpose of regulation 32(2).

Procedural posture: Holman J granted permission to apply for judicial review but limited permission to the first of three grounds; challenges under Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR and s.149 Equality Act 2010 were refused. The present hearing concerned only the first ground.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether regulation 32(2) must be construed purposively so that a PPA's agreement to a referral back cannot be withheld where a former officer raises a reasonable case that a pension decision was wrong (as held in Crudace and Haworth);
• Whether delay and associated practical obstacles (for example, unavailability of original medical witnesses) are relevant considerations and, if so, how they may be weighed against the claimant's case; and
• Whether the defendant's decision was vitiated by irrelevant considerations, failure to address relevant considerations or inadequate reasons.

Court's reasoning and conclusion: The judge accepted, for present purposes, the purposive construction of regulation 32(2) adopted in Crudace and Haworth that the provision is a mechanism to correct mistakes and to secure correct pension entitlement. Nevertheless, the court held that delay is a permissible relevant consideration not confined solely to whether a fair reconsideration is possible; it may also be weighed against the merits because of legitimate public interests in finality and in avoiding wasteful public expenditure on an unfair process. Applying those principles, the judge found the defendant had rationally concluded that the very long delay (about 14 years), together with the unavailability of the two main medical witnesses and the resulting risk that no fair reconsideration could take place, fairly outweighed the claimant's less than clear causation case. The application for judicial review was refused.

The application for judicial review is refused. Although the court accepted the purposive construction of regulation 32(2) that it can operate to correct mistakes in pension decisions, the Chief Constable lawfully withheld agreement because the very long delay and the unavailability of key medical witnesses meant a fair reconsideration was not possible and the decision rationally weighed delay and process costs against the claimant's causation case.

Permission to apply for judicial review was granted by Holman J but limited to the first of three grounds; permission to advance ECHR Article 1 and s.149 Equality Act 2010 challenges was refused. No further appellate history is stated in the judgment.